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In March 2007, legislators across the country renewed the 
long-dormant campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA),1 which would create a constitutional guarantee of equal 
treatment on the basis of gender.2 If approved by two-thirds of 
both houses of Congress, and ratified by three-fourths of the 
states, the ERA (or Women’s Equality Amendment, as it is 
sometimes called)3 will become the Twenty-eighth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.4 And although the ERA faces 
long odds,5 it is representative of a much larger wave of 
amendment proposals involving such politically and constitu-
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 1. Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2007, at A1. 
 2. The original Equal Rights Amendment was approved by thirty-five 
states—just short of the thirty-eight it needed for ratification. Jim Abrams, 
Uphill Fight Forecast for Equal Rights Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 
2007, at A4. The text of the Amendment reads as follows: 
  SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
  SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
  SEC. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date 
of ratification. 
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). 
 3. Abrams, supra note 2. 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing process for constitutional amend-
ment). 
 5. See Abrams, supra note 2. 
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tionally controversial issues as school prayer, flag burning, and 
gay marriage.6 
Many of these same issues have recently been the target of 
another form of court-centered constitutional politics: jurisdic-
tion-stripping legislation that keeps certain claims (or clai-
mants) out of federal courts, including in some cases the Su-
preme Court itself. Rather than requiring courts to pronounce 
something constitutional, as amendments do, these acts deny 
federal courts the power to pronounce on the issue at all. The 
effect, in any case, is often the same, since both prevent the 
federal courts from declaring unconstitutional acts that they 
otherwise might have struck down. 
Perhaps the most notable recent jurisdiction-stripping leg-
islation targets claims filed by Guantánamo detainees. In the 
past two years, Congress has passed two major pieces of juris-
diction-stripping legislation: the Graham-Levin Amendment to 
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)7 and the later and more 
sweeping Military Commissions Act (MCA).8 And while Con-
gress’s power to keep Guantánamo detainees’ claims out of the 
Supreme Court remains controversial and somewhat unclear,9 
 
 6. Alexander K. Hooper, Recent Developments, Jurisdiction Stripping: 
The Pledge Protection Act of 2004, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 511, 513 (2005) (“This 
surge of court-stripping legislation is the strongest since the early 1980s, when 
court decisions upholding school busing programs provoked an equally strong 
congressional reaction.”). Of course, this is not the first decade in which scho-
lars have felt besieged by amendment proposals. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at 20. 
 7. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 
Stat. 2739, 2741–43; see also 151 CONG. REC. S12,752–53 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (presenting the text of the Graham-Levin 
Amendment).  
 8. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). Section 7(a) of 
the MCA purports to strip federal courts of all jurisdiction over habeas claims 
brought by aliens detained by the United States government whom the gov-
ernment has determined to be enemy combatants or who are awaiting deter-
mination of such status. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (to be codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(e)). 
 9. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 (2006) (denying the 
government’s motion to dismiss), the Supreme Court considered and rejected 
an argument that the Graham-Levin Amendment stripped it of jurisdiction 
over Hamdan’s then-pending case. Because the Court found that the Graham-
Levin Amendment did not apply to pending cases, it did not address the 
Amendment’s constitutionality. Id. at 2763–64, 2769 n.15. 
In February 2007, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia held that the MCA denied all federal jurisdiction 
over pending habeas cases filed by aliens held at Guantánamo. Boumediene v. 
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007), 
2008] AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 973 
 
the Guantánamo bills are not the only recent examples of legis-
lation designed to “zone” congressionally disfavored legal 
claims out of the federal courts.10 Other proposals, many of 
which attracted widespread support, would have eliminated di-
versity jurisdiction,11 jurisdiction over cases involving school 
desegregation,12 abortion,13 or, as discussed in more detail be-
low, public prayer.14 Although the exact boundary of Congress’s 
jurisdiction-stripping power is murky, making it a continuing 
source of grist for academic mills,15 it is clear that Congress re-
 
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). The Supreme Court refused to hear an 
expedited appeal from the D.C. Circuit’s decision, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. 
Ct. 1478 (2007), but Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg published a dissent 
from denial of certiorari, id. at 1479 (Souter, Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., dissent-
ing), and Justices Stevens and Kennedy published a joint statement pointedly 
indicating their willingness to review future claims “[w]ere the Government to 
take additional steps to prejudice the position of petitioners seeking review in 
this Court,” id. at 1478 (statement of Stevens & Kennedy, JJ.). In June 2007, 
the Court reversed course and mustered the necessary five votes in favor of 
oral argument. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (granting certiora-
ri). The case was heard on December 5, 2007. Supreme Court Revisits Habeas 
Rights of Guantánamo Enemy Combatant Detainees, 76 U.S.L.W. 3297 (2007). 
 10. See Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: 
Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
129 (1981) (discussing eighteen proposals to reduce the jurisdiction of federal 
courts). 
 11. See, e.g., H.R. 9622, 95th Cong. (1978) (abolishing diversity jurisdic-
tion except for alienage and statutory interpleader); S. 2389, 95th Cong. 
(1978); S. REP. NO. 691, 71st Cong, 2d Sess. (1930). To modern lawyers, the 
elimination of federal diversity jurisdiction may seem radical, but many emi-
nent scholars and judges have supported the idea over the years. E.g., Lum-
bermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (referring to the “mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial 
system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction”); Nat’l Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650–51 (1949) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). 
 12. See generally Chip Jones, Comment, Freeman v. Pitts: Congress Can 
(and Should?) Limit Federal Court Jurisdiction in School Desegregation Cases, 
47 SMU L. REV. 1889 (1994); Constance W. Watson, Comment, The Helms-
Johnston Amendment: A Congressional Effort to Curb the Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts and to Restrict Busing as a Remedy in School Desegregation Cases, 
26 HOW. L.J. 1661 (1983). 
 13. S. 210, 98th Cong. (1983) (stripping lower federal court jurisdiction 
over abortion cases). The Ninety-seventh Congress proposed similar bills. See 
H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. § 4 (1981); S. 158, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981). 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. See infra Part II.B for a partial review of the rich literature. For more 
current discussion, see Conference, Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference 
on the State of the Judiciary, 95 GEO. L.J. 895 (2007). 
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tains broad power under Article III’s Exceptions Clause16 to 
keep certain claims out of federal court.17 
These two forms of constitutional politicking18—
amendment and jurisdiction stripping—are on a colossal colli-
sion course, one that threatens to transform processes of “high-
er” constitutional- and court-centered politics into tools for eve-
ryday legislative battles.19 Indeed, constitutional amendment 
and jurisdiction-stripping legislation already have more in 
common than constitutional and federal courts scholars seem to 
 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (describing the Supreme Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction “both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make”). 
 17. This does not mean, of course, that such claims cannot be heard, only 
that federal courts cannot hear them. State court judges also swear to uphold 
federal law and have concurrent jurisdiction to consider federal law claims. 
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341–44, 346 (1816). 
 18. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, A Constitution We Are Amending: 
In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 436 (1983) (re-
ferring to amendment as “constitutional politics as opposed to constitutional 
law”). I do not mean here to invoke the same kind of “higher lawmaking” 
Bruce Ackerman describes as involving “Publian appeals to the common good, 
ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens expressing their assent 
through extraordinary institutional forms.” Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs 
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984) [herein-
after Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution] (footnotes omitted); see also 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE] (discussing “higher lawmaking”); Bruce Acker-
man, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989)  
[hereinafter Ackerman, Constitutional Politics]. 
 19. Writing in 1984, Ackerman noted that, “[t]hough no permanent dam-
age has yet been done, the law of constitutional amendment has increasingly 
been dominated by short-term considerations of factional advantage rather 
than a long-run sense of constitutional development.” Ackerman, Discovering 
the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1065. The same might easily be said of ju-
risdiction-stripping proposals. See Laura N. Fellow, Note, Congressional Strip-
tease: How the Failures of the 108th Congress’s Jurisdiction-Stripping Bills 
Were Used for Political Success, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1121 passim 
(2006) (explaining the political benefits to legislators of supporting such pro-
posals). 
To borrow and alter slightly Ackerman’s conception of a dualist democra-
cy—which separates “constitutional” from “normal” politics, Ackerman, Con-
stitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 461–62—this trend suggests that the dis-
tinction between the two tiers of politics is collapsing, or at least that means of 
politics traditionally associated with the former are now becoming common 
currency for the latter. I say “alter” because Ackerman is not particularly con-
cerned with these characterization-of-process questions. Constitutional poli-
tics, in his conception, can and usually do occur without regard to Article V. 
See id. at 509–15 (noting examples of higher lawmaking in ways that supple-
ment the process of Article V). 
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realize.20 Both are legislative attempts to undo or avoid court 
decisions, and both generally find support in a reclaiming-the-
Constitution-from-the-courts rhetoric. Even the targeted sub-
ject matters are similar: flag burning,21 gay marriage,22 and 
school prayer,23 for example, have been the subject of both 
amendment and jurisdiction-stripping proposals in recent 
years. And despite spotty success records,24 politicians increa-
singly utilize both of these procedures to advance substantive 
political issues, particularly in areas such as school prayer, 
where courts might otherwise declare politically popular legis-
lation unconstitutional. 
 
 20. One scholar who has devoted sustained attention to both areas is Ak-
hil Amar, whose work has addressed both constitutional amendment, see, e.g., 
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Re-
visited], and federal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist 
View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. 
REV. 205 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exagge-
rated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-
Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990). 
 21. Following the Supreme Court’s rulings in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), the Senate 
came within three votes of approving an amendment that would have crimina-
lized desecration of an American flag. Robin Toner, Flag-Burning Amendment 
Fails in Senate, but Margin Narrows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A1. Simi-
lar amendments have been proposed since, and last year came within a single 
vote of Senate approval. Carl Hulse, Flag Amendment Narrowly Fails in Se-
nate Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at A1. Those who believe that an 
amendment would be “overkill” have suggested that jurisdiction-stripping 
measures might suffice instead. Ramesh Ponnuru, One Branch Among Three, 
NAT’L REV., July 29, 2002, at 32. 
 22. In the aftermath of the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), mul-
tiple amendments defining marriage as existing only between a man and a 
woman were proposed in both houses of Congress. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 106, 
108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. 
(2004). These amendments failed in both the House and Senate, but were 
quickly followed with the Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. 
(2004), which would have severely curtailed federal jurisdiction. For a helpful 
chronology of events, see Fellow, supra note 19, at 1154–56. 
 23. Amendments protecting school prayer have been proposed many 
times, though few have gained much currency. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 11, 110th 
Cong. (2007). Jurisdiction-stripping proposals have been proposed just as fre-
quently. See infra notes 170–78 and accompanying text. 
 24. More than 10,000 amendment proposals have been brought before 
Congress. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: 
An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 111, 112 (1993). Jurisdiction-stripping legislation has fared little bet-
ter. Fellow, supra note 19, at 1123 (noting the “eternal failure” of such bills). 
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Constitutional amendment and jurisdiction stripping, how-
ever, operate under something of an uneasy truce. The pro-
posed ERA provides a brief but illustrative hypothetical of how 
the two processes interact, rather than simply proceeding on 
parallel tracks. If proposed and ratified, the ERA would subject 
gender discrimination to strict scrutiny, the same “strict in 
theory and fatal in fact”25 level of review that federal and state 
courts commonly apply to invalidate racially discriminatory 
acts under the Equal Protection Clause.26 But like all constitu-
tional-rights guarantees, the ERA would rely heavily on the 
federal courts to give it meaning and enforce its protections. 
What if a future Congress, unhappy with the ERA but unable 
to muster the votes necessary to re-amend the Constitution and 
excise it,27 were instead to pass a law stripping federal courts of 
jurisdiction over ERA claims?28 Petitioners bringing ERA chal-
lenges would not be zoned out of court entirely, since state 
courts would remain responsible for enforcing the amendment. 
 
 25. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978) (striking down a race-based medical 
school admissions program); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) 
(“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”). 
 27. Only once has the U.S. Constitution been explicitly amended to re-
move another amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth 
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby re-
pealed.”); see also id. amend. XVIII (prohibiting the “manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors” within the United States and its juris-
diction); Richard F. Hamm, Short Euphorias Followed by Long Hangovers: Un-
intended Consequences of the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments, in 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 164, 182 (Da-
vid E. Kyvig ed., 2000). 
 28. See Christopher T. Handman, Note, The Doctrine of Political Accoun-
tability and Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraint 
to Congress’s Exceptions Clause Power, 106 YALE L.J. 197, 199 (1996) (noting 
that jurisdiction stripping may be a second-best alternative for legislators who 
are unable to muster support for a revising amendment). 
A 2004 Republican Policy Committee paper endorsed jurisdiction strip-
ping as a better “check” on the judiciary than impeachment or amendment: 
The best check available to the people is for their representatives to 
eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts over particular issues. 
The alternatives are too cumbersome for all but the most fundamen-
tal matters. For example, it is very difficult to remove judges from of-
fice, and the constitutional amendment process is inadequate to ad-
dress all ill-advised judicial pronouncements. 
U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., The Case for Jurisdiction-Stripping 
Legislation: Restoring Popular Control of the Constitution 4 (Sept. 28, 2004), 
available at http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Sept2804CourtStrippingSD.pdf. 
2008] AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 977 
 
But like the Guantánamo detainees, ERA claimants would find 
themselves facing sharply limited forum choices and potentially 
hostile judges.29 A jurisdiction-stripping bill could thus effec-
tively re-amend the post-ERA Constitution, at least in part. 
But can Congress really use the Exceptions Clause to effec-
tively re-amend the Constitution by stripping federal jurisdic-
tion over amendment-based claims?30 This Article argues that 
it cannot, at least not always. In fact, Congress’s power to strip 
federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims is more limited 
than commonly supposed because the Exceptions Clause can 
be—and may already have been—limited through subsequent 
amendment. Some version of this argument has already won 
widespread support in the academy. Ever since Lawrence Sag-
er’s 1981 Harvard Law Review Foreword,31 federal courts scho-
lars have increasingly embraced the idea that the rest of the 
Constitution places “external constraints” on the Exceptions 
Clause. Under this theory, Congress cannot strip federal juris-
diction in ways that would violate certain amendments, or per-
 
 29. Many jurisdiction-stripping proposals are premised on the belief that 
state courts will find a way around Supreme Court precedent, or else will 
simply ignore it, knowing that their decisions cannot be overturned by the 
Court. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper 
Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 505 
(1983); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court 
Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External 
Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 926 (1982); Charles E. Rice, Limiting Fed-
eral Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress 
Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190, 197 (1981); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Con-
stitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 68 (1981). 
Indeed, it seems almost inevitable that some state courts would ignore 
federal mandates in hotly contested areas of law, such as those typically tar-
geted by current amendment and jurisdiction-stripping proposals. Public 
prayer—the target of both constitutional amendments and a jurisdiction-
stripping proposal considered in Part II.C—is only the most prominent exam-
ple. See also Todd Kleffman, Moore Won’t Move Display, MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER (Ala.), Aug. 15, 2003, at A1, available at http://www 
.montgomeryadvertiser.com/specialreports/TENcommandments/ 
StoryAlabamamoore15w.htm (reporting Alabama Supreme Court Justice 
Moore’s defiance of a federal court order to remove a monument of the Ten 
Commandments). 
 30. The Supreme Court has been wary of congressional attempts to 
“amend” the Constitution outside of Article V. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (overturning the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, and stating that upholding the Act would mean that “[s]hifting legis-
lative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the 
difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V”). 
 31. Sager, supra note 29. 
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haps even provisions of the original Constitution.32 How exactly 
these external constraints function, and to what degree they 
limit legislative power, largely remain open and difficult ques-
tions. 
But there is another predicate question that external con-
straints theorists must answer: how do constitutional amend-
ments revise preexisting constitutional provisions like the Ex-
ceptions Clause, and why should we read amendments as 
imposing constraints on the clear language of the Clause when 
not a single amendment—nor any other provision in the Con-
stitution—even mentions it? This Article attempts to answer 
those questions by advancing a thicker understanding of the 
amendment process and a more nuanced understanding of the 
Exceptions Clause itself. If successful, this effort should par-
tially relieve two of legal academia’s central obsessions—
defining the impact of constitutional amendments and estab-
lishing limits on Congress’s power to strip federal jurisdiction—
by showing how the two shed light on one another. 
Part I of the Article begins that project by elaborating the 
implicit but undertheorized point that constitutional amend-
ments can, and usually do, trump provisions of the original 
constitutional text, even though they rarely identify the specific 
sections of the Constitution that they alter. The argument in 
this Part draws on evidence from the text and structure of the 
Constitution and from current constitutional theory. But while 
many scholars have addressed the foundational problems relat-
ing to how constitutional amendments come about33 or what 
specific amendments say,34 few have explored the relationship 
 
 32. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Juris-
diction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 
900 (1984) (arguing that congressional power over federal jurisdiction is sub-
ject to limitations “inferable from other provisions of the Constitution”). 
 33. The depth of the literature makes even a cursory sampling nearly im-
possible. For some of the most recent and provocative thinking on the subject 
of the process of constitutional amendment, see Ackerman, Discovering the 
Constitution, supra note 18, at 1051–57; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra 
note 20; Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethink-
ing the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 387 (1983); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the 
Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993). 
Discussion of the “convention method” of constitutional amendment—
which I will discuss in even less detail, because it has never been successfully 
pursued—has spawned an almost embarrassing richness of scholarship. See 
infra note 52. 
 34. Space constraints prevent even a partial listing of the scholarship ad-
dressing the content of particular amendments. Suffice it to say, entire aca-
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between constitutional amendments and specific provisions of 
the Constitution’s original text. Part I concludes by drawing on 
existing theory to suggest how courts and scholars can better 
understand this relationship. 
Part II of the Article applies Part I’s theory to the legenda-
rily intractable problem of the “limited” Exceptions Clause. 
Theories of the Clause’s limits tend to fall into two major cate-
gories. The first explains the Clause’s limitations by pointing to 
“internal” constraints that are inherent to Article III and the 
“essential functions” of the judiciary in our constitutional sys-
tem. The second includes “external” constraints imposed on the 
Clause by the rest of the Constitution, particularly the amend-
ments. Although external constraints theories have gained in-
creasing currency,35 they remain hampered by a relatively thin 
understanding of exactly how those constraints interact with 
the Exceptions Clause itself. The amendment theory described 
in Part I, which concludes that amendments implicitly alter ra-
ther than add to the Constitution, provides a new justification 
for the external constraints theory. In doing so, it places the ex-
ternal constraints theory on stronger footing by giving textual, 
logical, and historical support to the argument that constitu-
tional provisions—including the Exceptions Clause—can be 
implicitly amended.36 
I.  THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS   
This Part provides the basis for a more robust external 
constraints theory by analyzing the impact of constitutional 
amendments on the original Constitution. Drawing from the 
text and history of the Constitution, as well as from constitu-
tional scholarship, it revisits the interpretive relationship be-
tween the amendments and the provisions of the original doc-
ument. The discussion here demonstrates that the 
amendments’ placement at the end of the Constitution—an un-
dertheorized but important part of the constitutional story—
 
demic careers (not to mention thousands of reported federal decisions) have 
been spent unpacking the meaning of a handful of words from the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
 35. See, e.g., Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1365, 1379–81 (2007) (arguing that jurisdiction-stripping proposals should be 
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equality). 
 36. See Tribe, supra note 18, at 445 (“In short, remembering that it is an 
amendment to the Constitution we are considering may be almost as impor-
tant as remembering that it is a Constitution we are, in the end, amending.”). 
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makes their impact on certain constitutional provisions harder 
to identify, though no less important. 
A. AMENDMENTS ARE NOT ADDITIONS: PUTTING THE “AMEND” 
INTO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
Constitutional amendments can, and generally do, change 
provisions of the original Constitution without ever specifically 
identifying which part of its text they mean to change. Estab-
lishing the impact of an amendment thus requires an interpre-
tive synthesis between the amendment and the document it 
amends, in order to determine what has and has not been 
changed. 
This of course does not mean that amendments automati-
cally and unavoidably “trump” the language of the original 
Constitution.37 Alex Kozinski and Eugene Volokh have rightly 
pointed out that a presumption that later-in-time amendments 
radically change the meaning of all prior provisions could lead 
to absurd results.38 But while amendments may not always 
change everything that comes before them,39 they are—by vir-
tue of their placement, timing, and intended impact—
necessarily on different footing from the rest of the Constitu-
tion. They were passed to alter or add something—to “amend” 
or improve the original document. Sometimes it is clear what 
defect or omission an amendment means to correct, even when 
the amendment does not specifically identify its target. For ex-
 
 37. Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 157 n.180 (1992) (arguing 
that neither of two different-in-time amendments “‘trumps’ the other; rather 
they must be synthesized into a coherent doctrinal whole”). 
 38. Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Commentary, A Penumbra Too Far, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1650 (1993) (“[W]hile the chronology might mean the 
Thirteenth Amendment could alter the First, this doesn’t mean it does alter it. 
The notion that every constitutional amendment is a partial repeal of every 
previously-enacted constitutional provision has hair-raising implications. Does 
the Sixteenth Amendment, which grants Congress the power to ‘lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,’ authorize a tax levied only 
on income derived from sale of antigovernment literature, or a tax only on 
blacks? Does it allow collection techniques that violate the Fourth Amend-
ment? Does the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause authorize ex 
post facto laws, or the suspension of habeas corpus?” (footnotes omitted)). 
 39. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005) (expressing the 
“framers’ clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause”); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (finding that “the Twenty-first Amendment 
does not pro tanto repeal the Commerce Clause” and that “the relevance of the 
Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional provisions becomes increa-
singly doubtful”). 
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ample, the Seventeenth Amendment nowhere mentions Article 
I, yet it clearly amends Section 3 of Article I by providing for 
direct election of senators rather than their election or ap-
pointment by a state legislature.40 Usually, however, amend-
ments do not make it so clear what part of the original Consti-
tution they address, and it is up to interpreters of the 
Constitution to divine their impact. For example, the Supreme 
Court has implied that Congress’s power to grant copyright 
protections—a power specifically listed in Article I41—may be 
limited by the First Amendment,42 despite the fact that nothing 
in the First Amendment specifically declares its intention to 
change the Copyright Clause.43 Nor have constitutional scho-
lars seen any reason to busy themselves demonstrating that 
the drafters of the First Amendment had the Copyright Clause 
or any other specific provision of the original Constitution in 
mind when they proposed the Amendment.44 It is simply un-
derstood that the First Amendment limits the enumerated 
powers that Article I gives to Congress.45 The example may 
 
 40. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing that senators shall “be 
elected by the people” of each state), with id. art. I, § 3 (stating that the Senate 
was to be “chosen by the Legislature” of each state). 
 41. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 42. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (suggesting that copy-
right statutes may raise First Amendment problems if they lack “built-in free 
speech safeguards”). 
 43. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I (failing to refer to the Copyright Clause). 
 44. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877, 907 (1996) (“‘Congress’ in the First Amendment is taken, 
without controversy, to mean the entire federal government, even though 
elsewhere ‘Congress’ certainly does not include the courts or the President.”). 
Those who are already familiar with the jurisdiction-stripping literature, 
which I discuss below in Part II.B, may note that these arguments have much 
in common with the “external constraints” approach. See infra notes 191–212 
and accompanying text. 
 45. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 96 
(1961) (“[C]ongressional power in this sphere, as in all spheres, is limited by 
the First Amendment.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 106 n.2 (1958) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (noting that the First Amendment “of course would have the 
effect in appropriate cases of limiting congressional power otherwise pos-
sessed”); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 
(1935) (“The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of 
Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.”). 
Adrian Vermeule and Ernest Young argue that “there is little reason to 
think that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and ratifiers had any special 
insight into the Fifth Amendment’s original meaning. It is an empirical ques-
tion whether the framers of later provisions are skilled interpreters of the 
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seem simplistic, but it illustrates the generally unexamined 
proposition that constitutional amendments often trump “orig-
inal” constitutional text even when they do not specifically refer 
to the text they alter.46 As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
“the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress 
or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these 
granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they 
may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provi-
sions of the Constitution.”47 
Understanding that amendments often have an unstated 
impact does not, of course, commit courts and scholars to any 
particular understanding of an individual amendment’s content 
or reach. An amendment might broadly alter the text of the 
original Constitution, or it might do so narrowly, or it might in 
some limited cases be more of an addition than a true amend-
ment.48 In the First Amendment context, for example, one does 
not have to agree with Justice Hugo Black’s famously absolut-
ist reading49 to believe that whatever limits the First Amend-
 
original meaning of earlier provisions . . . .” Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. 
Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratex-
tualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 765 (2000). Kurt Lash’s recent historical 
analysis of the Ninth Amendment, by contrast, suggests that the drafters of 
later-in-time amendments did consider (and alter) the content of prior 
amendments. Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amend-
ment, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6–7, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953008) (arguing that the 
Ninth Amendment’s reference to “‘certain rights’ enumerated in the Constitu-
tion” includes, at a minimum, “the rights ‘numbered’ or listed in the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution”); see also id. (manuscript at 23) (“Also, even 
if the Ninth was originally understood as a guardian of local autonomy, later 
amendments substantially altered the original federalist structure of the 
Ninth Amendment.”). 
 46. The same is true of the relationship between different-in-time 
amendments. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he Ele-
venth Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies  
. . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 47. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (striking down Ohio elec-
tion laws on equal protection grounds). 
 48. See infra Part I.C. 
 49. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960) 
(“The phrase ‘Congress shall make no law’ is composed of plain words, easily 
understood. . . . Neither as offered nor as adopted is the language of this 
amendment anything less than absolute.”). The Supreme Court has rejected 
Justice Black’s absolutist position in a variety of cases, see, e.g., Konigsberg v. 
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 44 (1961), and various scholars have debated the me-
rits of his approach as opposed to a “balancing” or “categorization” test. See, 
e.g., John H. Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Ca-
tegorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
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ment imposes, it imposes on Congress. Similarly, whether the 
First Amendment covers obscene speech is an entirely separate 
question from whether that coverage limits congressional pow-
er under Article I.50 Nor does the potential of amendments to 
change what comes before them mean that there is no limit on 
what an amendment can achieve.51 Just as a self-described 
amendment can occasionally be nothing more than an addi-
tion—an issue explored in greater detail in Part I.C—it is poss-
ible that a particularly radical amendment (whether passed by 
the convention method52 or the legislative proposal method) 
 
1482 (1975); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912–16 (1963) (discussing “ad hoc balancing” 
and “absolute” tests); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 
71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440–45 (1962) (analyzing seven objections to the balanc-
ing approach). 
 50. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in 
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270, 276 (1981) (differentiating between 
cases “covered” by the First Amendment and those cases “protected” there-
under, with the former referring to whether a certain speech act receives con-
stitutional protection at all and the latter referring to the level of protection it 
receives). 
 51. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 703, 754–57 (1980); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil 
Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 22 (1987); 
Walter F. Murphy, The Right to Privacy and Legitimate Constitutional 
Change, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 213, 227 (Shlomo Slonim ed., 1990); cf. Thomas M. Cooley, 
The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 MICH. L.J. 109, 118 (1893) 
(“Now an amendment . . . must be in harmony with the thing amended . . . . It 
must not be something so entirely incongruous that, instead of amending or 
reforming it, it overthrows or revolutionizes it.”); John R. Vile, The Case 
Against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 191, 213 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [herein-
after RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION] (arguing that the Constitution’s implicit 
limits on Article V “wisely protect[ ] liberty by guarding against the transient 
whims of the majority”). Donald Lutz has also considered the possibility of 
amendment as “periodic replacement of the entire document.” Donald S. Lutz, 
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION, supra, at 237, 237. 
 52. For highlights of the debate regarding the constitutional convention 
method, see generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Let-
ter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972) [hereinafter Black, A Letter to a 
Congressman]; Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A 
Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957 (1963) [hereinafter Black, The Proposed 
Amendment of Article V]; Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the 
“Limited” Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979); Gerald Gunth-
er, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. 
L. REV. 1 (1979); and William W. Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the 
States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 
DUKE L.J. 1295. For a discussion of the constitutional convention method, see 
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might better be classified as a constitutional revision,53 or the 
creation of an entirely new constitution.54 
Even this brief explanation of the impact of amendments 
would be superfluous if amendments specifically identified the 
constitutional text they were meant to alter. Amendments have 
such potentially variant scope and reach primarily because 
they do not identify the provisions they alter, as do other legal 
changes. Statutory amendments, for example, tend to clearly 
identify, strike out and replace particular provisions.55 Con-
tracts and other “practical” legal documents also generally 
make amendments and changes to the text itself.56 It is indeed 
difficult to imagine it any other way. But whether through his-
torical accident or constitutional design,57 amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution are not interwoven with the text, but rather 
appended to the end, leaving it to later generations to deter-
mine what the drafters of the amendments intended to amend. 
Naturally, the need to identify amendments’ impact on the 
preexisting Constitution increases the demands on constitu-
tional interpretation. Judges considering an amendment-based 
case must not only determine what the amendment enables or 
prohibits (What does it mean to pass no law “respecting an Es-
 
Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitu-
tional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627, 
628–30 (1979). 
 53. Sanford Levinson notes that some state constitutions differentiate be-
tween “amendment” and “revision” and prescribe different procedures for the 
two. Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution 
Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional 
Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 13, 19 (citing 
Gene R. Nichol, Constitutional Judgment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1118 (1993)). 
 54. See Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imper-
fect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra 
note 51, at 163, 176–77 (distinguishing between amending, revising, and 
transforming a constitution). 
 55. Interestingly, “amendments” to bills do not serve a strike-out function, 
at least not always. They are often attached as “riders” that do not “amend,” 
nor necessarily even relate to, the subject mater of the bill itself. See Com-
monwealth v. Burnett, 48 A. 976, 977 (Pa. 1901) (describing a rider as a “new 
and unrelated enactment or provision”); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject 
Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 842–43 (2006) (ex-
plaining the process by which committee members attach riders). 
 56. Cf. House v. McMullen, 100 P. 344, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1909) (“The par-
ticulars wherein it was sought to revise the written agreement are, as stated 
by respondent: ‘First, to substitute the word ‘exchange’ for the word ‘sell’; 
second, to insert a more particular description of the real property which is the 
subject matter of the contract; third, to strike out a certain term in the con-
tract; and, fourth, to insert a certain other term in the contract.’”). 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
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tablishment of Religion”?) but also what part of the Constitu-
tion the amendment addresses (Who is not allowed to pass such 
laws?). This is akin to determining what presumed defect the 
amendment corrects. Drafters of the First Amendment, for ex-
ample, probably targeted Article I, Sections 8 and 9 (the sec-
tions listing grants and limits on congressional power)58 which, 
it turns out, is where Madison originally proposed the amend-
ment’s placement.59 The following Section considers in more de-
tail the decisions the Founders made with regard to placement, 
and what impact that placement has on the meaning of the 
amendments. 
B. EVIDENCE FROM THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Textual and historical evidence from the Founding Era 
both support an understanding of amendments as changes ra-
ther than additions to the Constitution. The text of Article V 
and the preamble to the amendments demonstrate the framers’ 
belief that, in amending the Constitution, subsequent genera-
tions would essentially be re-creating the document. Further 
illustrating the framers’ belief in the power of the amendments, 
some expressed concern that placing the amendments at the 
end would render their impact uncertain, and thus possibly 
more sweeping. 
1. The Constitution’s Text 
While the Constitution provides for its own amendment, it 
says nothing explicit about how amendments interact with its 
provisions. But a close reading of the Constitution’s text sup-
ports the theory laid out in the previous Section—amendments 
do not simply add to the Constitution, but actually change what 
came before them, despite the fact that few amendments ac-
tually identify the text they mean to alter. 
The natural place to begin—and, for some, the place to 
end60—is with the text of Article V. By providing for peaceful, 
 
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8–9. 
 59. See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text for a retelling of the 
framers’ brief discussion about whether the amendments should be interwo-
ven with the Constitution’s text or appended to the end. 
 60. For arguments that Article V is the only way in which the Constitu-
tion may be amended, see generally David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Ar-
ticle V, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 117; David R. 
Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Dow, The Case of Article V]; and John R. 
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democratic alteration of the Constitution, Article V effectively 
codifies the constitutional revolution that produced the Consti-
tution in the first place. Although his own theory of constitu-
tional amendment emphatically disclaims reliance on Article V, 
Bruce Ackerman has proclaimed that 
Article V is the most fundamental text of our Constitution, since it 
seeks to tell us the conditions under which all other constitutional 
texts and principles may be legitimately transformed. Rather than 
treating it as a part of the Constitution’s code of good housekeeping, 
we should accord the text of Article V the kind of elaborate reflection 
we presently devote to the First and Fourteenth Amendments.61 
Article V reads in full: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it ne-
cessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, 
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Consti-
tution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the sever-
al States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the 
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided 
that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thou-
sand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and 
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in 
the Senate.62 
 
Vile, Legally Amending the United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Ar-
ticle V’s Mechanics, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 271 (1991). 
For arguments to the contrary, see Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, su-
pra note 18; Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18; Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 20; and Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sover-
eignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, su-
pra note 51, at 89. I limit the discussion here to amendments which have been 
passed through Article V’s enumerated processes. I thus do not consider here 
the impact, if any, of “amendments” occurring outside the confines of Article V. 
My initial sense is that the general framework I have advanced should trans-
late without much problem to any kind of amendment, no matter the process 
by which it was approved. 
I also have not addressed the impact on my Exceptions Clause analysis of 
what many have referred to as “judicial amendments.” See, e.g., JOHN R. VILE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS, 
AND LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 35–55 (1994) (considering Su-
preme Court decisions and their impact on constitutional change). Again, the 
analysis would be the same. 
 61. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1058; see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 
1563 (1998) (reviewing DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: 
AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1776–1995 (1996)) (“The amendment 
process is thus not peripheral to the constitution, but is its essence.”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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By its terms, Article V thus enumerates only two limita-
tions on its own scope63—one relating to slavery, and another 
regarding state representation in the Senate. It also lists only 
two procedures by which amendments can be proposed and ra-
tified. The first option is a legislative proposal approved by two-
thirds of both houses of Congress and then ratified by three-
fourths of the states.64 The alternative is a proposal resulting 
from a “Convention” convened by Congress “on the Application 
of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,” and 
whose proposals shall become amendments following approval 
by three-fourths of the states.65 
The most striking thing about these two methods is how 
closely they track the process for ratifying the original Consti-
tution. Considering that amendments effectively change the 
original Constitution, it is unsurprising that provisions for 
amendment underwent “significant adjustments” as the ratifi-
cation procedure evolved.66 Under either method of constitu-
tional amendment, the approval required—“ratifi[cation] by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con-
ventions in three fourths thereof”67—is essentially identical to 
the vote requirement for ratification of the Constitution—nine 
of the thirteen states. This nine-of-thirteen requirement is the 
nearest possible approximation of three-fourths of the then-
existing states to which the Constitution was presented for ra-
tification.68 And although the convention method of constitu-
tional amendment has never been successfully invoked, it too 
echoes the conditions under which the Constitution was 
 
 63. See also infra notes 290–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the Civil War-era Corwin Amendment, which would have explicitly amended 
Article V by further limiting states’ power to abolish slavery. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 65. Id. 
 66. David E. Kyvig, Arranging for Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of 
Constitutional Design, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 9, 18. 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 68. Although nine-thirteenths is actually slightly less than three-fourths, 
Kyvig notes that the number nine was chosen through a “process of groping 
toward compromise,” and that Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, and Mary-
land supported a ten-of-thirteen requirement. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 21. In-
cidentally, three-fourths is almost precisely the fraction of the framers who 
signed the original document in Philadelphia. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, 
Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 514 (1995) (noting that 
thirty-nine of the fifty-five delegates—seventy-one percent—signed the con-
vention’s final proposal). 
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created.69 By reproducing the requirements for constitutional 
creation, Article V lends structural, inferential reinforcement to 
the idea that constitutional amendments have the power to 
change the original document rather than simply adding to it. 
In maintaining a high bar for changes to the Constitution, the 
framers recognized that, by passing constitutional amend-
ments, later generations would essentially engage in a process 
of constitutional re-creation analogous to their own process of 
constitutional design.70 
Of course, one might reasonably object that the similarities 
between the requirements for the Constitution’s creation and 
the requirements for the amendments’ creation simply reflect 
the fact that amendments are additions to the Constitution, not 
that they change what has come before them. Under this ap-
proach, interpreters should read amendments alongside, not on 
top of, prior constitutional provisions, unless they specifically 
and clearly identify the text they mean to alter. Another woe-
fully underappreciated part of the Constitution’s text—the 
Preamble to the Amendments—further clarifies this point. 
 
 69. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1059 (“[T]he 
Article V procedure for calling a ‘Convention’ is obviously modeled upon the 
process by which the 1787 Convention was called into being.”); see also Black, 
The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 52, at 963 (suggesting that 
the Founders were thinking of the Philadelphia Convention when they created 
the “convention” method of amendment). 
 70. As George Washington himself would write a few months later, 
the People (for it is with them to Judge) can as they will have the ad-
vantage of experience on their Side, decide with as much propriety on 
the alterations and amendments which are necessary . . . . I do not 
think we are more inspired, have more wisdom, or possess more vir-
tue, than those who will come after us. 
Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 10, 1878), in 
THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 81, 
83 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986). 
In The Federalist No. 85, however, Hamilton argued that in practical 
terms amendments would be easier to ratify than the original Constitution: 
[E]very amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be 
a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There 
would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in rela-
tion to any other point, no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite 
number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And con-
sequently whenever nine or rather 10 states, were united in the de-
sire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take 
place. There can therefore be no comparison between the facility of ef-
fecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a 
complete constitution. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 592 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (footnote omitted). 
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For all the importance that scholars have placed on the 
words “We the People” in the Preamble to the Constitution,71 
little if any attention has been paid to the words—or even the 
existence—of the Preamble to the Amendments.72 But like the 
Constitution’s Preamble, which many scholars have used to il-
luminate the meaning of the Constitution, the introduction to 
the Amendments may cast light on their meaning and their re-
lationship to the rest of the Constitution. In full, the Preamble 
to the Amendments reads: “Articles in Addition To, and 
Amendment of, the Constitution of the United States of Ameri-
ca, Proposed by Congress, and Ratified by the Legislatures of 
the Several States, Pursuant to the Fifth Article of the Original 
Constitution.”73 
Several phrases here are worthy of close examination. 
First, the word “Articles” echoes the headers separating the 
seven major sections—“Articles”—in the original Constitu-
tion.74 This suggests that the framers saw amendments as be-
ing at least as important as the Articles of the Constitution it-
self. 
The phrases immediately following “Articles” help clarify 
the relationship of these new “Articles”—the amendments—to 
the original text: they are “in Addition To, and Amendment of, 
the Constitution of the United States of America.”75 The word 
“and” and the commas setting off the second phrase do a lot of 
work here. Together they suggest the existence of two kinds of 
amendments: those that “add” to the Constitution and those 
that “amend” it. 
The next two phrases in the Amendments’ Preamble—
“Proposed by Congress, and Ratified by the Legislatures of the 
Several States”—echo Article V’s ratification requirements, in-
voking both the congressional proposal and state ratification 
 
 71. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 18; see also U.S. 
CONST. pmbl. 
 72. A LexisNexis search conducted on March 22, 2008 in the “US Law Re-
views and Journals, Combined” database for the phrase “Articles in Addition 
To, and Amendment of ”—the second Preamble’s equivalent of the first’s “We 
the People”—turns up only thirteen hits, most of them in articles that simply 
reproduce the Constitution in its entirety. A search for “We the People,” un-
surprisingly, results in more hits than LexisNexis is able to report (at least 
3000). 
 73. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X pmbl. 
 74. See id. arts. I–VII. 
 75. Id. amends. I–X pmbl. 
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procedures.76 As described above, those procedures in turn 
mimic the procedures for ratification of the Constitution itself, 
lending support to the notion that amendments have the power 
to change the Constitution.77 Finally, the Preamble’s reference 
to the “Original” Constitution indicates that there is a docu-
ment other than the preamendment Constitution—that the 
Constitution itself changes and becomes a “new” constitution 
when it is amended.78 
Even acknowledging that the Constitution itself changes, 
several interpretations of an amendment’s effect remain possi-
ble. One is to simply say that the Constitution becomes longer 
and more elaborate through the amendment process. This is 
the “Addition” reading. But another is to say that every time 
the document is amended, a new Constitution emerges, one 
whose provisions have been altered in light of subsequent 
amendments which must be synthesized with the original 
text.79 This is the “Amendment” reading, and, in analyzing the 
impact of most amendments, it is the better one, as the follow-
ing Sections demonstrate. 
2. Historical Evidence Surrounding Article V and the 
Amendments 
In addition to this textual support for the Amendment 
reading, at least two kinds of constitutional history support the 
notion that amendments can and do implicitly change the 
meaning of the original Constitution: the Founders’ (few) 
statements regarding Article V, and the historical record of the 
early constitutional amendments.80 
In a very real sense, the need for amendment is what gave 
birth to the Constitution.81 In addition to their notorious subs-
 
 76. Id.; see id. art. V. 
 77. See supra notes 66–69. 
 78. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1873) (de-
scribing the original Constitution and its first twelve amendments as being 
“historical and of another age” since “three other articles of amendment of vast 
importance have been added by the voice of the people to that now venerable 
instrument”). 
 79. Ackerman describes this as “multigenerational synthesis.” Ackerman, 
Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 517; see also Bruce Ackerman, The 
Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1793–1809 (2007) [hereinafter 
Ackerman, The Living Constitution] (describing the “Conversation Between 
Generations”). 
 80. Limitations on space prevent full consideration of all the amendments, 
but of course the thesis presented here would benefit from such discussion. 
 81. Some have argued that amendments are necessary for the very legi-
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tantive weaknesses—such as the lack of a federal taxing pow-
er82—the Articles of Confederation were also structurally brit-
tle and inflexible. They could be amended only by unanimous 
consent of all the states, making reform all but impossible.83 
David Kyvig, perhaps the leading scholar of Article V and the 
history of constitutional amendment, writes, “The requirement 
of unanimous state agreement to congressionally initiated pro-
posals to amend the Articles of Confederation was, from the 
outset, the defining characteristic of the first government of the 
United States.”84 The framers were thus forced to “amend” an 
unamendable document.85 As Kyvig puts it, “It is reasonable to 
argue, in fact, that the 1787 Constitution was both the first and 
the greatest act of U.S. constitutional amendment.”86 
But despite the importance of amendment to the existence 
and evolution of the Constitution, the constitutional history of 
Article V is notoriously sparse.87 Early in the Philadelphia 
Convention, the delegates approved—without much discus-
sion88—the Virginia Plan, which determined that a “provision 
 
timacy of the Constitution. Dellinger, supra note 33, at 387 (“An unamendable 
constitution, adopted by a generation long since dead, could hardly be viewed 
as a manifestation of the consent of the governed.”). 
 82. Erwin Chemerinksy, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 
89, 90 (2001) (“Under the Articles of Confederation, the limited federal gov-
ernment had no taxing power and therefore no revenue to spend.”). 
 83. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
906, 926 n.40 (1988) (“A fair reading of the Articles of Confederation made it 
clear that they could be abrogated only by the unanimous consent of all the 
states.”). 
 84. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 37 (1996). 
 85. Kyvig points out that “the drafters of the 1787 Constitution acknowl-
edged its revisionary character as they declared it an attempt to ‘form a more 
perfect union.’” Id. at 42. 
 86. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 18. 
 87. Dow, The Case of Article V, supra note 60, at 41 (“As was the case with 
the Federalist Papers, the issue of the article V amendment process received 
relatively little attention at the convention.”); see also id. at 41 n.202 (listing 
“the entirety of references in the records of the Constitutional Convention to 
the amendment process”). 
 88. The only significant discussion was an oft-repeated statement from 
George Mason: 
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confede-
ration has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be 
necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regu-
lar and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It 
would be improper to require the consent of the Natl. Legislature, be-
cause they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that 
very account. The opportunity for such abuse, may be the fault of the 
Constitution calling for amendmt [sic]. 
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ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union 
whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the 
National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.”89 Specif-
ic discussion of the mechanism for amendment, however, was 
left for the final week of the four-month Philadelphia Conven-
tion. During that period the delegates proposed a second me-
thod of constitutional amendment.90 Not only would the na-
tional legislature have to call a convention for amendment on 
application of two-thirds of the states’ legislatures; it could also 
act on its own and propose amendments to the states for ap-
proval.91 The only remaining debate was what level of state ap-
proval would be required to ratify these legislative proposals.92 
By a vote of six states to five, the delegates rejected a two-
thirds majority, and instead approved a proposal raising the 
standard to three-fourths.93 As discussed above, this require-
ment essentially echoed the requirements for constitutional ra-
tification, placing constitutional amendment on nearly identical 
procedural grounds with constitutional creation. 
But Article V’s ancestry is even more complicated than 
that, because the Article effectively shared a constitutional 
womb with its own progeny. Although the Federalists pressed 
the cause of ratification—frequently referring to the amend-
ment process as a check on centralized power94—they were also 
drafting and proposing the first amendments to the Constitu-
tion they had just created. The Founders’ treatment of those 
proposals, which became the Bill of Rights, reveals much about 
 
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 202–03 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1911). 
 89. Id. at 22. 
 90. Carlos E. González, Representational Structures Through Which We 
the People Ratify Constitutions: The Troubling Original Understanding of the 
Constitution’s Ratification Clauses, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1373, 1445 (2005) 
(“Article V was the product of two brief and unreflective sessions during the 
last week of the Philadelphia drafting convention.”). 
 91. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 88, at 
558–59. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 559. There was apparently no dissent to this proposal. Id. 
 94. KYVIG, supra note 84, at 66 (“Article V, the 1787 U.S. Constitution’s 
provision for its own amendment, became the hinge upon which swung accep-
tance of the Philadelphia convention’s proposal.”); see also id. at 66–86 (de-
scribing Article V’s role in the ratification and adoption of the U.S. Constitu-
tion). 
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their view of the amendments’ relation to the “original” Consti-
tution.95 
James Madison presented the first set of twelve amend-
ments (ten of which would become the Bill of Rights, and 
another of which would, 202 years later, become the Twenty-
seventh Amendment)96 to the first Congress, whose member-
ship largely overlapped with that of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion itself.97 Madison’s amendments echoed language that 
many states had proposed during their constitutional ratifica-
tion conventions.98 But while Congress and the states approved 
the Bill of Rights by the end of 1791,99 Congress was not as 
clear on where it wanted to place the amendments, or what text 
they were meant to change. 
Madison suggested that the amendments be interwoven 
with the text of the original Constitution. In his proposal, most 
of the amendments—including versions of the First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth—would have been inserted “in 
article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4.”100 An earlier 
version of the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of juries in 
criminal cases would have been inserted in place of “article 3d, 
 
 95. I owe my understanding of the Bill of Rights’ placement to Kyvig’s il-
luminating discussion of this debate. For more detail and better storytelling 
see Kyvig, supra note 66, at 28–30. 
 96. Brian C. Kalt, The People’s Forest and Levy’s Trees: Popular Sover-
eignty and the Origins of the Bill of Rights, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 124 n.9 
(2000) (reviewing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1999)). 
 97. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in 
the First Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1994) (listing some 
of the holdover members and describing the First Congress as a continuation 
of the Philadelphia Convention). 
 98. See, e.g., New York Ratification Convention (July 26, 1788), in 
GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A 
COMMENTARY app. I-2 at 305 (1995) (including the Declaration or Bill of 
Rights); Virginia Ratification Convention (June 26–27, 1788), in ANASTAPLO, 
supra, app. I-1 at 299 (including the Proposed Declaration or Bill of Rights). 
 99. Kalt, supra note 96, at 124–25. 
 100. James Madison’s Proposals in the House of Representatives (June 8, 
1797), in ANASTAPLO, supra note 98, app. J-1 at 315, 316–17. Interestingly, 
the Confederate Constitution of 1861, which adopted wholesale nearly ninety 
percent of the Federal Constitution, effectuated Madison’s plan and rear-
ranged the Bill of Rights, interspersing them throughout the rest of the Con-
stitution. See generally MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(1991). The first eight amendments were placed in Article I, Section 9, along-
side the other restraints on congressional power. Id. at 142. The Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments became part of Article VI. Id. at 150. 
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section 2, the third clause.”101 At least in terms of their place-
ment, then, Madison treated constitutional amendments the 
way legislators treat statutory amendments: as strike-outs and 
changes to the original text. 
Roger Sherman objected that “this is not the proper mode 
of amending the constitution. . . . We ought not to interweave 
our propositions into the work itself, because it will be destruc-
tive of the whole fabric.”102 Sherman, who apparently saw the 
amendments as a kind of state-created appendage to the 
people’s Constitution, moved to add the amendments to the end 
of the existing document.103 To do otherwise, he suggested, 
would threaten the entire constitutional enterprise: 
“The [C]onstitution is the act of the people, and ought to remain en-
tire. But the amendments will be the act of the state governments; 
again all the authority we possess, is derived from that instrument; if 
we mean to destroy the whole and establish a new constitution, we 
remove the basis on which we mean to build.”104 
Madison responded that placing the amendments at the 
end of the Constitution could cause “a very considerable embar-
rassment” because “it will be difficult to ascertain to what parts 
of the instrument the amendments particularly refer; they will 
create unfavorable comparisons, whereas if they are placed 
upon the footing here proposed, they will stand upon as good 
foundation as the original work.”105 
Michael Jenifer Stone chimed in with a somewhat different 
concern: Madison’s proposed placement would accord the 
amendments too much respect, altering beyond recognition the 
Constitution that the framers had just signed.106 Invoking the 
already-deified George Washington, Stone argued that insert-
ing amendments into the Constitution itself would suggest that 
“George Washington, and the other worthy characters who 
composed the convention, signed an instrument which they 
 
 101. James Madison’s Proposals in the House of Representatives (June 8, 
1797), supra note 98, app. J-1 at 317–18. 
 102. The Congressional Register, 13 August 1789, in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 
112, 117 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS]. 
 103. KYVIG, supra note 84, at 100–01. 
 104. Id. at 100 (quoting The Congressional Register, 13 August 1789, supra 
note 102, at 117). 
 105. The Congressional Register, 13 August 1789, supra note 102, at 118 
(emphasis added). 
 106. Id. at 120. 
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never had in contemplation.”107 Elbridge Gerry, voicing a view 
of constitutional amendment similar to that described in Part 
I.A of this Article, responded that amendments—no matter 
where they were placed—would be, in accordance with the lan-
guage of Article V, “valid to all intents and purposes, as part of 
the [C]onstitution.”108 In Gerry’s view, Stone’s objection that 
amending the Constitution meant replacing it proved either too 
much or too little: “[C]onsequently the objection goes for noth-
ing, or it goes against making any amendments whatever.”109 
The House originally sided with Madison’s proposal, but 
less than a week later reversed course and adopted Sherman’s. 
This decision “set a precedent for all amendments to come: they 
would follow the original text of the Constitution.”110 The first 
Congress’s structural choice has had a major, albeit underap-
preciated, impact, not just on the appearance of the Constitu-
tion, but on its interpretation. A moment’s thought about how 
different our constitutional law would look today without a 
separate Bill of Rights should drive the point home. Would the 
First Amendment be accorded such reverence, and be inter-
preted so broadly, if it were tucked into the other restrictions 
on congressional power in Article I, Section 9? Would Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment have had such a revolutionary 
impact if it had been added to Congress’s enumerated powers 
in Article I, Section 8? Could (or should) future amendments be 
inserted into the “original” Constitution? 
By leaving the impact of amendment unclear, the ratifiers 
of the Bill of Rights created the risk—feared by Madison—that 
the amendments would be discarded as a mere appendage. But 
they also left open the possibility that courts would interpret 
the amendments’ impact broadly. Rather than being polished 
away, many of the amendments’ blurry edges were reconceptu-
alized as “penumbras”111 surrounding their core guarantees, 
thus enabling some of the Supreme Court’s most rights-
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 121–22. 
 109. Id. at 122. 
 110. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 29. 
 111. The most famous example, of course, is Justice Douglas’s opinion in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), in which he found that 
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” Justice 
Black, in dissent, pointed out that the argument-from-fuzziness can cut both 
ways, diluting rights just as easily as it can expand them. Id. at 509–10 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
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expansive decisions.112 In that sense, the Anti-Federalists ac-
tually won a victory, albeit perhaps unintentionally, by secur-
ing the Bill of Rights in the form of freestanding amendments 
rather than as part of the original text. Since the Founders 
were primarily concerned with controlling the power of the leg-
islature and the executive—both of which were seen as more 
powerful than the courts113—this court-centered power of in-
terpretation may have vindicated their vision. 
Madison’s fear that the amendments would not be accorded 
the same respect as the original text does not seem to have 
played out in practice, but his concern about the difficulty of in-
terpretation certainly has. Just a week after the debate on the 
amendments’ placement had ended, he wrote, “It is already ap-
parent I think that some ambiguities will be produced by this 
change, as the question will often arise and sometimes be not 
easily solved, how far the original text is or is not necessarily 
superseded, by the supplemental act.”114 Exploring and at-
tempting to ascertain which parts of the Constitution have 
been changed by which amendments is part of the major project 
of this Article. The following Section considers a few interpre-
tive methods of identifying amendments’ impact. 
C. DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 
The previous two Sections set out, and then defend, the 
theory that constitutional amendments can alter the meaning 
of provisions of the original document, even without specifically 
referring to them. This Section suggests ways for courts and 
scholars to better identify the impact of amendments on specific 
constitutional provisions. For every constitutional amendment 
with a broad impact on the provisions of the original Constitu-
 
 112. The right to privacy, which largely traces its lineage to Griswold, is 
perhaps the most prominent example. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
564–65 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Griswold in ac-
cepting a right to personal privacy and finding a limited right to abortion); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452–54 (1972) (citing Griswold for an individ-
ual’s right to privacy and use of contraceptives). 
 113. Alexander Hamilton famously referred to the judiciary as the “least 
dangerous” branch. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 
70, at 522–23; see also RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 184 
(1969) (“Legislative, not judicial, despotism worried the Founders; judges were 
trusted, legislators were not.”). 
 114. Kyvig, supra note 66, at 30 (citing Letter from James Madison to Al-
exander White (Aug. 24, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 352 
(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979)). 
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tion—such as the First or the Fourteenth—there are others 
with a much more limited impact. The Twenty-first Amend-
ment, for example, repeals the Eighteenth’s prohibition on the 
“manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors.”115 
But the Twenty-first Amendment has no clear impact on the 
Exceptions Clause,116 nor on the provisions of Articles I or II, 
except to the degree that it changed the executive’s power to 
prosecute violations of the Eighteenth Amendment. It is a nar-
row and precise amendment whose impact falls squarely and 
solely on another amendment, which it excises, and does noth-
ing more. 
The task for interpreters of the amendments (or of provi-
sions of the amended Constitution) is thus, in part, to deter-
mine what parts of the Constitution the amendments mean to 
amend. Does the First Amendment, which by its terms ad-
dresses only “Congress,” apply also to the exercise of power by 
the executive branch?117 Does the Fourteenth Amendment “in-
corporate” the Bill of Rights and make those rights applicable 
against the states?118 These are fundamental questions of con-
stitutional law, but they are fundamentally different questions 
from those regarding what specific amendments do or do not 
allow. That is, the question of whether the First Amendment 
does or does not permit the regulation of obscene speech is logi-
cally and analytically distinct from the question of whether the 
Amendment restricts the power of Congress (thus “amending” 
Article I) or the executive (thus “amending” Article II).119 
It is the second set of questions that the present discussion 
addresses, because the placement of the amendments at the 
end of the Constitution inevitably raises them, and because 
they have generally gone unasked. This is not to say that courts 
and scholars are entirely without guidance. Legal scholars have 
devoted extraordinary attention to the processes by which the 
 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1. 
 116. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 117. See Strauss, supra note 44, at 907 (explaining that the use of “Con-
gress” in the First Amendment refers to the entire federal government, even 
though other uses of “Congress” do not). 
 118. This question received one of its most famous treatments in Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), with Justice 
Black playing his usual role as the greatest proponent of the full-incorporation 
theory,  and Justice Frankfurter acting as his foil, id. at 59–68 (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
 119. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
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Constitution is amended120 and the content of specific constitu-
tional amendments.121 Some scholars have even made inroads 
in the difficult project of sorting amendments by type. Sanford 
Levinson, for example, differentiates between “amendments” 
and “interpretations,”122 and Bruce Ackerman draws a line be-
tween “transformative amendments”123 and those that are 
“rightly interpreted as a superstatute.”124 But for all of the at-
tention that constitutional amendment receives, surprisingly 
little has been written about the impact that constitutional 
amendment has on the original document.125 
One promising interpretive tool for analyzing the relation-
ship between different constitutional phrases—an analysis an 
interpreter trying to give meaning to the amendments must 
do—is Akhil Amar’s “intratextualism.”126 Amar describes this 
 
 120. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 18; see also Frede-
rick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 145, 160–61 (“The process of constitution-
al amendment, therefore, can take place on one of two levels. On the constitu-
tional level, it can take place within the contours of the constitution itself . . . . 
[But] the process of constitutional amendment may also take place at another 
level, when these logically and politically antecedent conditions are them-
selves amended.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Four-
teenth Amendment, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT, supra note 27, at 110, 110 (describing the “substantial—and 
some might say overwhelming—body of scholarship on the ‘intent,’ ‘meaning,’ 
and ‘understanding’ of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 122. Levinson, supra note 53, at 33. 
 123. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 524; see also Ack-
erman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 18, at 1056 (describing “struc-
tural” amendments). 
 124. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 522 (describing 
the Twenty-sixth Amendment as such because “[a]ll it did was change the vot-
ing age from twenty-one to eighteen. Nobody looked upon it as the culminating 
expression of a broad-based effort to revise the foundational principles of our 
higher law”). 
 125. There is also a lengthy literature addressing the limitations, if any, on 
the amending power, and whether courts should have any power to consider 
the validity of amendments. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 33; Tribe, supra 
note 18. 
The debate is long-running indeed. For older examples, see William L. 
Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223, 
228 (1919) (arguing that amendments may not take away the legislative pow-
er of the states), and William L. Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the 
United States, 33 HARV. L. REV. 659, 662–63 (1920) (arguing in response to 
Marbury that states’ rights are already adequately protected and that the Su-
preme Court should have no power to approve or disapprove amendments). 
 126. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999). 
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theory as a kind of “holistic” textualism,127 whose practitioners 
(among whom Amar counts such luminaries as Chief Justice 
Marshall128 and Justice Story129) read seemingly isolated con-
stitutional phrases in conjunction as a way to give meaning to 
both.130 In Amar’s words, an interpreter employing intratex-
tualism “tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears 
in the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitu-
tion featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase.”131 
Although Amar does not argue as much, intratextualism is 
most powerful when applied to the relationship between 
amendments and the text of the original Constitution, rather 
than to that between phrases in the original Constitution. In 
fact, the amendments all but beg for an intratextualist reading 
because they (for the reasons described in the previous Section) 
exist only as appendages to a document.132 Amar himself has 
compared the Bill of Rights to a constitution,133 but it is clear 
that the amendments presuppose—and rely on—some kind of 
preexisting document.134 They create affirmative limits on the 
enumerated powers laid out in the original Constitution, and 
the former are incoherent without the latter. To take the first 
few words of the Bill of Rights as an illustrative example, 
“Congress shall make no law”135 makes no sense without a 
prior Article establishing the existence of Congress and its 
power to make law in the first place.136 
 
 127. Id. at 785. 
 128. Id. at 755–58 (describing Marshall’s use of intratextualism in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). 
 129. Id. at 758–63 (discussing Story’s use of intratextualism in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)). 
 130. Id. at 748–49. 
 131. Id. at 748. 
 132. By pointing to the location of the amendments as well as their word-
ing, I am admittedly blending intertextualism with what Amar calls “[a]nother 
brand of holistic textualism,” which “squeezes meaning from the Constitution’s 
organization chart.” Id. at 797 n.197. 
 133. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 
1131, 1205 (1991). 
 134. In this sense, intratextualism as it applies to the amendments be-
comes a kind of intertextualism that connects the “separate” amendments and 
Constitution. 
 135. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 136. See Vermeule & Young, supra note 45, at 738 (“It is critical to under-
stand . . . that clause-bound interpretation is itself a component of intratex-
tualism. Standing alone, even a strong version of intratextualism is necessari-
ly incomplete.”). 
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Assessing the merits of his theory, Amar writes that 
“[p]erhaps the greatest virtue of intratextualism is this: it takes 
seriously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled 
grab bag of assorted clauses.”137 This is undoubtedly a virtue 
when analyzing the text of the original Constitution. It is a ne-
cessity when analyzing the amendments. Without the gravita-
tional pull of interpretation tying them to the Constitution, 
they would spin off into space like so many rogue satellites.138 
Although it is plausible, if debatable, that the framers who 
drafted and ratified the Article IV Territories Clause (“The 
Congress shall have Power to . . . make all needful Rules and 
Regulations”)139 had in mind the Article I Necessary and Prop-
er Clause (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper”),140 it is certain that 
they had the original Constitution in mind when they wrote the 
amendments. Like the drafters of statutory amendments,141 the 
authors and ratifiers of constitutional amendments must be 
presumed to have some fault or omission of the original Consti-
tution in mind.142 Implicitly applying this theory, Amar argues 
persuasively that the similarity between “Congress shall make 
no law”143 and the words of the Necessary and Proper Clause—
“Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws”144—echo 
 
 137. Amar, supra note 126, at 795. 
 138. I note that my argument here—which requires judges to connect two 
disparate parts of the Constitution—is, like Amar’s intratextualism, vulnera-
ble to the criticism that it demands too much of judges whose interpretive ca-
pacities are limited. See Vermeule & Young, supra note 45, at 731. However, I 
do not think that this objection is fatal, nor do I see a better alternative. The 
First Amendment must mean something, and because the amendments are 
not included in the Constitution as strike-throughs, some interpreter must de-
termine their relationship to the rest of the Constitution. Cf. Stone v. INS, 514 
U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it 
intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”). 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 140. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The example, though not the argument, comes 
from Amar, supra note 126, at 794. 
 141. Despite the comparative length and complexity of statutes vis-à-vis 
the Constitution, Congress is presumed to know the content of the statutes it 
is amending. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 70–78 (1988) (suggesting use of an acquiescence rule in 
interpreting legislative inaction). 
 142. For those few amendments which are more properly considered addi-
tions—or, in Ackerman’s terms, “superstatutes,” see supra note 124 and ac-
companying text—the drafters may have been more concerned with omissions 
from the Constitution than with problems with its terms. 
 143. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 144. Id. art. I. § 8, cl. 18. 
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each other, suggesting a “textual interlock.”145 After consulting 
the constitutional history for confirmation, he concludes that 
the First Amendment sought to “reassure all concerned that 
Congress lacked enumerated power to restrict speech and press 
(or to regulate religion, for that matter) in the states, notwith-
standing the Necessary and Proper Clause.”146 
But while textual connections may be sufficient to show 
what part or parts of the Constitution an amendment was 
meant to alter, they are certainly not necessary, even for inter-
preters who would otherwise prefer a “textual” approach. If 
such connections were required, many amendments would be 
rendered meaningless. The Eleventh Amendment, for example, 
was clearly a reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia,147 in which the 
Supreme Court held that Section 2 of Article III permitted suits 
against a state by citizens of another state.148 The Eleventh 
Amendment prohibits those very suits: “The Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”149 Nevertheless, nothing in the 
language of the Eleventh Amendment names Chisholm or Ar-
ticle III as its intended target.150 
Moreover, in interpreting these amendments, courts have 
not limited the amendments’ reach to simply “overturning” or 
undermining a single case, even if a single case clearly inspired 
their passage. Rather, their broad language has given rise to 
 
 145. Amar, supra note 126, at 814. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see also James E. Pfander, Rethinking the 
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
555, 651 (1994) (“Everyone appears to agree that the Eleventh Amendment 
was passed in response to Chisholm.”). 
 148. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419. 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 150. The Eleventh Amendment is one of four amendments passed to “over-
rule” specific decisions of the Supreme Court; the other amendments are Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth, the Sixteenth, and the Twenty-sixth. JESSE H. 
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUPREME COURT 49 & n.133 (1980). 
None of them, however, identify the decision they were intended to overturn. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth, for example, fails to identify Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), as its intended target. Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36, 72–74 (1872) (noting that “the first clause of the 
first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was framed” primarily to reverse 
Dred Scott); CHOPER, supra, at n.133. 
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penumbras151 and interpretations that expanded their impact 
to include other provisions of the Constitution, including those 
uninvolved in the decisions they overturned.152 
Rather than attempting to describe the relationship be-
tween constitutional amendments and the text they amend, 
constitutional theorists have for the most part focused on other 
thorny amendment-related questions: When is constitutional 
amendment justified?153 Are there any inherent limits on the 
impact of amendments?154 Is Article V the only way to amend 
the Constitution?155 And what of the neglected “convention me-
thod” for constitutional amendment?156 Although all of these 
questions cast light on the process of constitutional amend-
ment, and may also help illuminate the content of amend-
ments, none addresses the core question tentatively answered 
in this Part: the impact of constitutional amendment on the 
original Constitution. The following Part uses this theory—that 
amendments alter rather than simply add to the original Con-
stitution—to measure the impact of a constitutional amend-
ment on another, particularly problematic provision of the orig-
inal Constitution: the Exceptions Clause. 
II. AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE  
The previous Part argued that constitutional amendments 
often implicitly amend prior constitutional provisions even 
without indicating the text they were meant to target. Interpre-
ters of the Constitution and its amendments thus face a diffi-
cult task in identifying, often in the absence of clear textual 
clues, which provisions have been altered by subsequent 
amendment. This Part applies that theory of constitutional 
amendment to the Exceptions Clause, whose apparently un-
bounded reach has long troubled constitutional and federal 
 
 151. Justice Douglas’ famous invocation of “penumbras” in Griswold in-
cluded the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 152. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
placement of amendments at the end of the Constitution, and the inclusion of 
non-specific language, allows a rights-expansive jurisprudence that would not 
be possible if they were simply made as strike-outs to the original text). 
 153. See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, GREAT AND 
EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 7 (1999) (suggesting guidelines for constitutional amendments). 
 154. See supra note 51. 
 155. See supra note 60. 
 156. See supra note 52. 
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courts scholars. It thus offers courts and scholars a new way to 
respond to the thorny problem of jurisdiction stripping, one 
that does not rely on internal, unenumerated “essential func-
tions,” but rather uses constitutional text to satisfy scholars’ 
instinctual belief that there must be limits on congressional 
power to strip federal jurisdiction. “External constraints” theor-
ists have already begun to construct a theory that limits the 
Exceptions Clause, relying on various other constitutional pro-
visions to articulate those limits. But their arguments too often 
rest on a simple assertion that the Exceptions Clause is limited 
by other provisions of the Constitution, and fail to address the 
inconvenient fact that none of those provisions mention the Ex-
ceptions Clause. By exploring the impact of one particularly 
important kind of external constraint—constitutional amend-
ment—and thickening the understanding of “external con-
straints” more generally, this Article builds on the external 
constraints theory and suggests that the First Amendment may 
have already implicitly amended the Clause. It then argues 
that future amendments could do the same explicitly. 
A. WHY IT MATTERS: USING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE TO 
“AMEND” THE CONSTITUTION 
Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction derives from the 
Exceptions Clause, a grant of congressional power nestled 
alongside the various jurisdiction-granting provisions of Article 
III.157 The Exceptions Clause is the broadest grant of congres-
sional power in the original Constitution158 not found in Article 
I, and it gives Congress wide authority to alter and abolish fed-
eral court jurisdiction.159 In context, the Clause reads: “In all 
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
 
 157. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 158. I thus set aside for now Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
other Congress-empowering amendments. See id. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Con-
gress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article.”); see also infra notes 239–40 and 252–56 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions 
Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 389 (1983) (“Those who argue against 
Congress’ power to make exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction . . . . 
are forced to deny an explicit power of Congress, expressly granted by the 
Constitution . . . .”). 
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make.”160 Unfortunately, constitutional history does not shed 
much light on the reasons for the Clause’s placement or mean-
ing of its words. The “exceptions and regulations” language 
“was adopted by the Convention on August 27 without a ripple 
of recorded debate, concern, or explication.”161 In fact, the only 
substantial debate about the Clause revolved around whether 
the Supreme Court’s review in admiralty and equity cases 
would involve both facts and law.162 
Despite this sparse constitutional history, it is reasonably 
clear that the Exceptions Clause power applies only to the Su-
preme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Article III defines the fed-
eral courts’ jurisdiction as extending to “all” cases arising under 
the Constitution, federal laws, treaties, or admiralty and mari-
time laws.163 This includes, for example, cases arising under 
the amendments, such as the First, the Fourteenth, or any fu-
ture amendments like the ERA. Because Article III places 
these cases under the appellate (rather than original) jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court,164 they are subject to congressional 
power under the Exceptions Clause.165 
 
 160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 161. Sager, supra note 29, at 51; see also Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents 
and Beginnings to 1801, in 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 240 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971) (noting that the Clause “was not de-
bated” by the Convention). For an exhaustive recounting of what drafting his-
tory there is, see Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take 
Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 64, 81–87 
(2007) (asserting that the “complaint that the Supreme Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction would let distant judicial elites substitute their will for the findings 
of juries” was “[a]lmost fatal to the Constitution’s adoption”). 
 162. BERGER, supra note 113, at 286–89 (arguing that the Exceptions 
Clause was originally intended to give Congress power over appellate review 
of fact findings); Claus, supra note 161, at 64; Gressman & Gressman, supra 
note 29, at 526–27. 
 163. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), Chief Jus-
tice Marshall paraphrased Article III as stating that “[t]he judicial power of 
the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.” 
 164. Congress has never granted federal courts complete jurisdiction over 
all cases “arising under” the Constitution or federal law. It did, however, ex-
tend general federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts in 1875. 
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (2000)). 
 165. The Exceptions Clause does not give Congress power to expand or con-
tract the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) at 174–75; Sager, supra note 29, at 24. 
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Theoretically,166 should it choose to do so, Congress could 
strip lower federal courts of the power to hear all cases arising 
under a particular amendment, or under the Constitution it-
self,167 and could do the same for the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction over such cases.168 Congress could, for example, 
pass a law saying that the Supreme Court shall have no power 
to hear cases involving the First Amendment, or the Four-
teenth. And as the introduction to this Article suggested, the 
more politicized the subject matter of an amendment, the more 
likely that amendment is to be the target of a subsequent juris-
diction-stripping proposal.169 The proposed ERA, to take just 
one example, would be a prime candidate. 
Although it has never directly stripped the Supreme Court 
of jurisdiction to hear cases arising under a particular amend-
ment, Congress has boldly used its Exceptions Clause power to 
propose stripping federal jurisdiction (including that of the Su-
preme Court) over certain unfavored subject matters.170 Among 
the recent high-profile examples are congressional attempts to 
deny the Guantánamo detainees access to federal courts.171 
Other proposals would have done the same for cases involving 
abortion,172 school desegregation,173 or school prayer.174 As 
 
 166. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of possible inherent or externally 
imposed limitations on this power. 
 167. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973) (“It is apparent 
that neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring 
every federal question arising under the federal law, or even every criminal 
prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be tried in an Art. III court be-
fore a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection against salary reduc-
tion.”). 
 168. One striking illustration of Congress’s broad power over appellate ju-
risdiction, at least to modern readers, is the fact that between the passage of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, and the Act of December 23, 1914, 38 
Stat. 790, the Court had no appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions 
that struck down state laws that conflicted with the Federal Constitution. See 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 320–21 (5th ed. 2003). 
 169. Perhaps the point could be put more finely. Amendments passed as a 
result of a temporary crest in popularity, or a concerted but fleeting cam-
paign—the Eighteenth Amendment, establishing Prohibition, is the best ex-
ample—are those most vulnerable to jurisdiction-stripping proposals, because 
the temporary majorities that created them are likely to dissolve. 
 170. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Ju-
diciary Has ‘Run Amok,’ Adding Congress Is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
8, 2005, at A21. 
 171. See supra notes 8–9 (discussing the Military Commissions Act). 
 172. S. 210, 98th Cong. (1983) (stripping in entirety lower federal court ju-
risdiction over abortion cases and severely curtailing the Supreme Court’s ju-
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many scholars have noted, such jurisdiction-stripping proposals 
tend to come in waves,175 often in reaction to controversial Su-
preme Court rulings—or even anticipated rulings—in political-
ly charged areas of constitutional law.176 
What scholars have generally failed to note, however, and 
what this Article attempts to make plain, is how the political 
and legal justifications and impact of jurisdiction-stripping 
proposals mimic those of constitutional amendments. Most re-
cent amendment proposals are initiated in response to, or an-
ticipation of, unpopular court decisions. Similarly, many juris-
diction-stripping proposals—such as the Marriage Protection 
Act,177 which would have eliminated federal jurisdiction to in-
terpret or assess the constitutionality of the Defense of Mar-
riage Act178—are patently designed to keep amendment-based 
constitutional claims out of federal court. Whether proposed as 
amendments or jurisdiction-stripping bills, the effect of these 
initiatives is to limit federal courts’ power over controversial 
subject matter. 
Stripping federal jurisdiction over an amendment, or any 
other piece of law is, of course, not exactly the same thing as 
deleting the amendment.179 Some scholars, for example, have 
argued that Congress’s power to make exceptions to the Su-
preme Court’s appellate jurisdiction carries with it a corre-
 
risdiction over the same); see also H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. § 4 (1981) (same); S. 
158, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981) (limiting lower court jurisdiction over abortion cas-
es). 
 173. H.R. 521, 98th Cong. (1983). 
 174. See infra Part II.C. 
 175. Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 
VAND. L. REV. 925, 926 tbl.1 (1965) (demonstrating that jurisdiction-stripping 
efforts between 1802 and 1957 were concentrated in seven time periods). 
 176. See Shirley M. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing 
Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 842–43 (1972) 
(“[C]ongressional reaction to issues of federal jurisdiction has always been fit-
ful and . . . the fits are usually induced by strong pressures imposed by partic-
ular events or by powerful constituencies that seek to influence results in par-
ticular causes that concern them.”). Senator Jesse Helms, a strong proponent 
of many jurisdiction-stripping bills, made the point quite clearly: “[T]here is 
more than one way to skin a cat, and there is more than one way for Congress 
to provide a check on arrogant Supreme Court Justices who routinely distort 
the Constitution to suit their own motions [sic] of public policy.” 130 CONG. 
REG. 5919 (1984) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
 177. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 178. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (providing that no state shall be required to 
give effect to another state’s recognition of same-sex marriage). 
 179. The latter can be achieved only through another amendment, which 
has happened only once. See supra note 27. 
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sponding legislative duty to grant equivalent jurisdiction to 
other federal courts.180 Perhaps more importantly, Congress 
has no control over state courts,181 and state court judges are 
bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply and enforce federal 
rights.182 But even if these safeguards are available to protect 
constitutional rights that legislation has barred from the Su-
preme Court’s docket, the intent and effect of jurisdiction-
stripping proposals is generally to burden the exercise of those 
rights.183 For example, although state courts would continue to 
hear cases involving such rights, scholars have long noted that 
state courts’ enforcement of Court precedent can be imperfect, 
or even defiantly resistant.184 In such a situation, stripping the 
 
 180. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. 
L. REV. 741, 778 (1984). 
 181. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 
n.15 (1982). 
 182. Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 959, 961 (1982); see U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 3; see also D.C. 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983) (“We have noted 
the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims.”); N. 
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64 n.15 (“[V]irtually all matters that might be heard in 
Art. III courts could also be left by Congress to state courts.”); Testa v. Katt, 
330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts cannot discriminate 
against the enforcement of federal rights). 
 183. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIMITING COURT 
JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: “COURT-STRIPPING” 2 
(2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32171_20050124.pdf 
(“[P]roponents of these proposals are generally critical of specific decisions 
made by the federal courts in the particular substantive area, and the propos-
als are represented as intended to influence the results or applications of such 
cases.”); see also Tribe, supra note 10, at 145 (“Unless Congress is merely re-
placing one remedial structure with another that is as protective of the consti-
tutional right at stake, withdrawing a basic civil or criminal line of defense 
from such a right is tantamount to authorizing its deprivation.” (footnote omit-
ted)). A jurisdiction-stripping bill could also be used more aggressively, in con-
junction with other federal legislation. For example, Congress could pass a law 
that simultaneously criminalizes certain speech acts that are at the boundary 
of the First Amendment and also strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear 
challenges to the law. The Guantánamo jurisdiction-stripping legislation, in 
conjunction with the executive’s expansion of the military tribunal system, has 
had substantially this effect. 
 184. See Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: 
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 
936–38 (1982) (arguing that stripping the Supreme Court’s appellate review 
would leave lower courts free to ignore existing Court precedent); see also Fre-
deric M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=981015 
(describing state courts’ defiance of Supreme Court precedent, sometimes with 
the Court’s apparent blessing). 
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Court’s jurisdiction may be a thinly veiled attempt to signal to 
state courts that they now have the power to undo the Court’s 
constitutional handiwork.185 
These attempts illustrate a basic but often unrecognized 
truth: when Congress strips jurisdiction over a particular sub-
ject matter, it often does so to protect laws in that subject-
matter area from challenges brought under constitutional pro-
visions or other legal bases. It is the grounds for challenge that 
suffer. So if Congress were to completely strip federal jurisdic-
tion over challenges to the constitutionality of military commis-
sions, for example, the “damage” would be to the Suspension 
Clause,186 the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,187 and the 
other legal grounds on which plaintiffs might challenge the mil-
itary commissions. Unlike amendments, however, which can 
“reverse” the impact of unpopular amendments or Court deci-
sions, jurisdiction-stripping is most effective as a preventative 
measure, to keep the Court from making such decisions in the 
first place.188 A public prayer amendment would effectively al-
ter the Constitution to say that school prayer does not violate 
the Establishment Clause,189 while a jurisdiction-stripping act 
 
 185. Laurence Sager famously characterized these jurisdiction-stripping 
proposals as “lewd wink[s]” from Congress to the state courts. Sager, supra 
note 29, at 41. 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”). 
 187. Id. amends. IV–VI (protecting against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and guaranteeing due process and other criminal prosecution rights). 
 188. See Fellow, supra note 19, at 1121–22 (noting that “the mere possibili-
ty of action . . . prompted a congressional response” in the form of “court-
curbing bills”). Jurisdiction stripping does not reverse Supreme Court 
precedent and would (at least theoretically) have the perverse effect (from 
their proponents’ perspective) of insulating those cases from federal review. 
See Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legisla-
tive Attempts to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 AM. U. 
L. REV. 497, 537 (1983) (“Should the Supreme Court be divested of jurisdiction 
over a particular area, the Court’s last pronouncement on the subject would 
constitute the definitive, unalterable law, which lower courts would be obliged 
to follow forever.”). 
One might argue that this point undermines my argument that amend-
ments and jurisdiction-stripping legislation are closely related, because it sug-
gests that jurisdiction stripping is a proactive measure used (albeit somewhat 
inartfully) to freeze Court precedent into place, while amendments are a reac-
tive measure to overturn decisions. There is merit to this point, though I be-
lieve that the gap it illustrates is small. 
 189. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong. (1983) (“Nothing in this Constitution 
shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or 
other public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or 
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on the same subject would prevent federal courts from ruling 
that it does.190 While jurisdiction stripping does not necessarily 
amend the Constitution, it can have a similar effect by insulat-
ing an entire issue from constitutional challenge. The next Sec-
tion considers possible limits on this congressional power, spe-
cifically analyzing whether these jurisdiction-stripping 
proposals are subject to the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause, and, if so, whether they pass. 
B. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXCEPTIONS 
CLAUSE POWER 
Federal courts scholars have long sensed, but struggled to 
find, limits on the Exceptions Clause power, and the Supreme 
Court has stubbornly refused to give them help. As the discus-
sion in this Section demonstrates, the Court has generally 
yielded to Congress on specific jurisdiction-stripping legislation 
while also carefully suggesting that the Exceptions Clause may 
have some as-yet-undefined restrictions. Congressional power 
to strip federal jurisdiction is thus generally considered to be 
nearly, or perhaps completely,191 limitless.192 
 
by any State to participate in prayer.”); H.R.J. Res. 133, 98th Cong. (1983). 
These amendment proposals have a longer history than many realize. Consid-
er an amendment proposed by Christian fundamentalists in the 1800s, which 
would have read, “Almighty God [is] the Author of National Existence and the 
source of all power and authority in Civil Government, Jesus Christ [is] the 
Rule of Nations, and the Bible [is] the formation of law and supreme rule for 
the conduct of nations.” KYVIG, supra note 84, at 189; see also id. at 190 (“Be-
tween 1894 and 1910 Congress received at least nine proposals to alter the 
Constitution’s preamble to express trust in or acknowledge the authority of a 
Christian God.”). 
 190. See infra Part II.C (discussing acts which would strip federal jurisdic-
tion over school prayer cases). 
 191. See, e.g., Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 
655 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting on other grounds) (“Congress need not 
give this Court any appellate power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction 
once conferred and it may do so even while a case is sub judice.”); Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 472–73 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting on other 
grounds) (“Congress has plenary power to confer or withhold appellate juris-
diction . . . . ”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossier ed., 1961) (“[T]he national legislature will have ample author-
ity to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations as will be calcu-
lated to obviate or remove . . . inconveniences.”), cited in Glidden Co. v. Zda-
nok, 370 U.S. 530, 567–68 (1962); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to 
Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 260 (1973) (“The power to make ex-
ceptions to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is a plenary power. It is given 
in express terms and without limitation . . . .”). 
 192. Sager, supra note 29, at 37 (acknowledging, although not endorsing, 
the “sense that Congress is immune from full constitutional scrutiny when the 
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In Ex parte McCardle, the first of three major post–Civil 
War jurisdiction-stripping cases, the Supreme Court considered 
a habeas corpus challenge brought by an individual alleging 
that he was unlawfully detained by the military in Mississippi 
following the Civil War.193 The Court heard oral arguments in 
the case, but before it could issue a decision, Congress repealed 
the 1867 Act “affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this [C]ourt 
in cases of habeas corpus.”194 Justice Salmon Chase explained 
that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “is conferred ‘with such 
exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall 
make,’”195 and concluded that the repeal of the law validly 
withdrew that jurisdiction.196 Justice Chase specifically noted, 
however, that other avenues for appeal remained open,197 a 
reading that the Court reiterated almost immediately in Ex 
parte Yerger,198 another case involving congressional attempts 
to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas cases. 
Acknowledging that its jurisdiction “is given subject to excep-
tion and regulation by Congress,”199 the Court in Ex parteYerg-
er nonetheless endorsed something of a clear-statement rule, 
and concluded that the asserted jurisdiction-stripping measure 
was ambiguous and thus insufficient to strip the Court’s juris-
diction over the pending case.200 
The final case in the post–Civil War jurisdiction-stripping 
triumvirate was United States v. Klein, in which the Court 
struck down a congressional attempt to withdraw the Court’s 
jurisdiction over a pending case involving a legislative act that 
altered the impact of a presidential pardon.201 The Court ruled 
that the jurisdiction-stripping statute in Klein was impermissi-
 
distribution of jurisdiction is at stake”); Harrison Tweed, Provisions of the 
Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 B.U. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1951) (“There are comparatively few who recognize that under the 
express words of the Constitution . . . Congress can largely, if not entirely, de-
prive the Court of this [appellate] jurisdiction.”). 
 193. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 194. Id. at 514. 
 195. Id. at 513. 
 196. Id. at 514. 
 197. Id. at 515 (“The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any 
cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867.”). 
 198. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1868). 
 199. Id. at 102; see also id. at 98 (“[A]ppellate jurisdiction is subject to such 
exceptions, and must be exercised under such regulations as Congress, in the 
exercise of its discretion, has made or may see fit to make.”). 
 200. Id. at 103. 
 201. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 128–29 (1871). 
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ble because it essentially prescribed a rule of decision (favoring 
the government) in a pending case,202 and also because it “im-
pair[ed] the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the consti-
tutional power of the Executive.”203 
Looking to this trio of cases and a few others,204 courts, pol-
iticians,205 and constitutional scholars206 have long sensed the 
existence of, but struggled to find, a limit on Congress’s power 
over federal jurisdiction.207 Their efforts to ascertain possible 
restrictions have yielded two main theories: “internal” limita-
tions based on the logic and structure of Article III, and “exter-
nal” limitations imposed by the rest of the Constitution. 
The search for internal constraints has framed the “main 
battleground for the debate about congressional authority over 
federal court jurisdiction.”208 The most famous attempt to arti-
culate internal constraints on the Exceptions Clause is undoub-
tedly that of Henry Hart, who argued that congressional power 
over jurisdiction is inherently limited by the nature of the con-
stitutional enterprise and the need to preserve the “essential 
functions” of the judiciary.209 In Hart’s words, exceptions to the 
 
 202. See id. at 147. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001); Felker v. Tur-
pin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996). 
 205. Senator Barry Goldwater, troubled by jurisdiction-stripping proposals 
advanced by fellow Republicans, said in 1982: 
  What particularly troubles me about trying to override constitu-
tional decisions of the Supreme Court by a simple bill is that I see no 
limit to the practice. There is no clear and coherent standard to define 
why we shall control the court in one area but not another. . . . 
  . . . . 
  Whether or not [C]ongress possesses the power of curbing judicial 
authority, we should not invoke it. 
128 CONG. REC. 2243 (1982). 
 206. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 132 (“But surely the proponents of that 
view [that Congress must have plenary power over federal jurisdiction] have 
pushed their point too far.”). 
 207. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring) (giving examples of 
situations where “the question whether the statute exceeded Congress’s Ex-
ceptions Clause power would be open”); FALLON ET AL., supra note 168, at 
341–42 (“[T]he limits of congressional power over Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction have never been completely clarified.”). 
 208. Gunther, supra note 32, at 900. 
 209. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953). 
Although Hart is rightfully seen as the father of the internal constraints 
theory, his seminal work also implicitly acknowledges the existence of “exter-
nal” constraints. See id. at 1372 (“Q. You’re saying, then, that the power to re-
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Court’s jurisdiction must “not be such as will destroy the essen-
tial role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”210 
Variants on this argument are common,211 with one popular 
textualist hybrid arguing that the very use of the word “excep-
tions” suggests that there must be some amount of jurisdiction 
left over after Congress is done “excepting.”212 
Other scholars have rejected the internal constraints 
theory213 and have instead looked outside of Article III for “ex-
ternal” constraints in the rest of the Constitution.214 The lead-
ing light for this search party is Lawrence Sager, who has ar-
gued that jurisdiction-stripping legislation must preserve the 
ability of the federal courts to effectively supervise state con-
duct.215 He bolsters this structural claim by noting that only 
Article III judges receive insulation from political pressure 
through benefits such as life tenure and nondiminution of sala-
 
gulate jurisdiction is subject in part to the other provisions of the Constitu-
tion? A. No. It’s subject in whole not in part.”). 
 210. Id. at 1365. One might rightfully wonder, based on the discussion of 
amendment in Part I, to which “plan” one is supposed to look. The original 
plan of the Founders? Or the new “plan” embodied in the amended Constitu-
tion? What if the latter contemplates a lessened judicial role? 
 211. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1039 (1982) (“A statute depriving 
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over . . . [a] category of constitu-
tional litigation would, however, violate the spirit of the Constitution, even if 
it would not violate its letter. . . . because the structure contemplated by the 
instrument makes sense . . . only on the premise that there would be a federal 
Supreme Court with the power to pronounce uniform and authoritative rules 
of federal law.”); Ratner, supra note 184; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional 
Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 
157, 168–70 (1960) (arguing that, because an exception is “an exclusion from 
the application of a general rule or description,” by definition “an exception 
cannot destroy the essential characteristics of the subject to which it applies”); 
Handman, supra note 28, at 206 (“Essential functions scholars . . . have con-
tinued to emphasize the Court’s primary role as guarantor of uniformity and 
supremacy of federal law.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 10, at 134–35; William S. Dodge, Note, 
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Orig-
inal Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an “Essential Role,” 100 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1021 (1991). 
 213. See Redish, supra note 29, at 911 (“[T]he ‘essential functions’ thesis is 
little more than constitutional wishful thinking . . . .”). 
 214. See Handman, supra note 28, at 200 (“The doctrine of political accoun-
tability, as a generally applicable, external constraint on congressional power, 
requires Congress to address affirmatively underlying policy concerns when it 
seeks to revoke Court jurisdiction.”). 
 215. Sager, supra note 29, at 43. 
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ry.216 Sager also suggests that Congress cannot manipulate ju-
risdiction as a means to an unconstitutional end,217 nor deny 
federal jurisdiction where such jurisdiction is necessary to pro-
vide an adequate remedy.218 Picking up this thread, William 
Van Alstyne, among others,219 argues that “broad as the power 
is in Congress to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court, it is not exempt from other constitution-
al provisions, lying outside the ‘exceptions’ clause, that indeed 
describe limitations that cut across most of the enumerated 
powers of Congress.”220 Within theorists’ discussion of possible 
limits on congressional power to strip jurisdiction, by far the 
most commonly identified “external constraints” on the Excep-
tions Clause are the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and 
equal protection guarantees.221 Indeed, along with separation of 
powers concerns,222 the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses are apparently presumed to be the only (or perhaps 
just the only necessary) external constraints on Congress’s Ex-
ceptions Clause power.223 
The Supreme Court, for its part, has carefully avoided en-
dorsing or disclaiming either the essential functions or external 
 
 216. Id. at 61–68. Martin Redish characterizes this as a “‘floating’ essential 
functions thesis.” Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congres-
sional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 
NW. U. L. REV. 143, 145 (1982). 
 217. Sager, supra note 29, at 68–80. 
 218. Id. at 80–89. 
 219. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 32, at 898; Redish, supra note 216, at 
161–66 (suggesting that the Due Process Clause may provide such an external 
restraint). 
 220. Constitutional Restraints upon the Judiciary: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 
98, 132 (1981) (statement of William Van Alstyne, Professor of Law, Duke 
University). 
 221. See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 183, at 12 (discussing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Claus, supra note 161, at 115 (referring to the Suspension, Due 
Process, and Petition Clauses); Rossum, supra note 159, at 420 (“The due 
process clause of the fifth amendment plays an especially prominent role in 
this argument.”); Sager, supra note 29, at 78–79; Van Alstyne, supra note 191, 
at 263–66 (pointing to due process constraints on the Exceptions Clause). 
 222. Hooper, supra note 6, at 518 (“Simply, congressional measures regu-
lating jurisdiction must comport with the constitutional requirements of equal 
protection, due process, and separation of powers.”); Fellow, supra note 19, at 
1131–32 (identifying separation of powers and due process-based arguments 
as two of the three leading arguments, with essential functions being the third 
and “weakest”). 
 223. But see Gressman & Gressman, supra note 29, at 523–24 (arguing 
that jurisdiction-stripping legislation, like all other congressional acts, must 
be “necessary and proper”). 
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constraints thesis. Many of its decisions have suggested that 
Congress’s power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is ple-
nary.224 But the Court has also taken pains to suggest the exis-
tence of yet-unidentified limits, repeatedly ruling that although 
this or that jurisdiction-stripping act might keep a particular 
claim out of federal court, the Court still retains jurisdiction 
through some other mechanism,225 perhaps implicitly suggest-
ing the preservation of some core of essential functions. In oth-
er cases, however, the Court has suggested that the Exceptions 
Clause may be limited by external constraints. Klein, for exam-
ple, lends implicit support to such an approach. In Klein, the 
Court struck down a jurisdiction-stripping law in part because 
it would have violated the executive’s pardon power, as de-
scribed in Article II, Section 2.226 At least implicitly, then, 
Klein’s holding endorsed a separation of powers limitation on 
the Exceptions Clause. The Court has never, however, ad-
dressed the central question of whether amendments to the 
Constitution represent a special kind of external constraint. 
The most notable case—perhaps the only case—addressing that 
question is the Second Circuit’s opinion in Battaglia v. General 
Motors Corp., which held that 
the exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to 
compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 
That is to say, while Congress has the undoubted power to give, with-
hold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme 
Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of 
 
 224. See The “Francis Wright,” 105 U.S. 381, 385 (1881) (“[W]hile the ap-
pellate power of this court under the Constitution extends to all cases within 
the judicial power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the power is 
confined within such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe.”); Barry v. Merce-
in, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847) (“By the constitution of the United States, 
the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred 
upon it by act of Congress; nor can it, when conferred be exercised in any other 
form, or by any other mode of proceeding than that which the law pre-
scribes.”). 
 225. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (interpreting 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as not completely 
stripping habeas jurisdiction in immigration cases because doing so would 
“raise serious constitutional problems”); see also supra notes 193–203 and ac-
companying text (discussing McCardle, Yerger, and other jurisdiction-
stripping cases); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1996) (“[S]ince [the 
AEDPA] does not repeal our authority to entertain a petition for habeas cor-
pus, there can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court 
of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2.”). 
 226. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1871); see also Tribe, supra note 10, at 
140. 
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life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take private 
property without just compensation.227 
The Second Circuit did not, however, explore the theory of ex-
ternal constraints on which its opinion implicitly rested. 
The external constraints line of reasoning, though less 
popular,228 is ultimately more promising than the search for in-
ternal constraints. Unfortunately, external constraints theor-
ists have not yet engaged in the close textual and structural 
analysis that their theory demands. To date, no external con-
straints theorist has given sustained attention to the impact of 
any particular constitutional provision on the Exceptions 
Clause, with Sager’s lengthy explanation of Article III’s tenure 
requirements being perhaps the closest attempt.229 As a result, 
the connection between external constraints and the Excep-
tions Clause remains undertheorized and in some sense incom-
plete. This Article attempts to fill that gap by addressing a par-
ticular kind of external constraint—constitutional 
amendment—that demands special treatment. 
In addition to filling the gap in external constraints theory, 
exploring constitutional amendment as an external constraint 
further illustrates the link between constitutional amendment 
and Exceptions Clause theory. Just as proposals to amend the 
Constitution and jurisdiction-stripping bills are closely related, 
the themes and questions of Exceptions Clause scholarship 
echo in amendment scholarship. Indeed, amendment scholar-
ship has its own versions of the plenary power thesis,230 the 
“essential functions” thesis,231 and “external constraints” theo-
 
 227. 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 335 
U.S. 887 (1948); accord Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (holding 
that judicial relief “cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or ar-
bitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause”). 
Lindsey involved an Oregon law that imposed special burdens on tenants, but 
not landlords, wishing to appeal adverse decisions. Id. at 64. Thus it did not 
address, or even mention, the Exceptions Clause. 
 228. Gunther, supra note 32, at 900; Handman, supra note 28, at 205 (de-
scribing the debate about Congress’s power over jurisdiction as being “largely 
between only two schools of thought”: the implicit internal constraints theory 
and a broad reading of congressional power). 
 229. See Sager, supra note 29, at 61–68. 
 230. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 446, 448 (1983) (“Congress is constitutionally free to propose, 
and the states to ratify, any amendment whatsoever.”); Note, The Faith to 
Change: Reconciling the Oath to Uphold with the Power to Amend, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1747, 1747 (1996) [hereinafter The Faith to Change] (“The orthodox 
understanding of Article V is that it is unlimited . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 231. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 
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ries.232 In many ways, amendment scholarship and Exceptions 
Clause scholarship are two troubled families with more in 
common than either seems to realize. The next Section demon-
strates this interconnectivity in exploring whether the First 
Amendment has amended the Exceptions Clause. 
C. IMPLICITLY AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE: THE 
(POSSIBLE) EXAMPLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Part I of this Article argued that constitutional provisions 
can be, and often are, altered by constitutional amendments 
even when not specifically mentioned by the amendments 
themselves. The first two Sections of Part II described the use 
of the Exceptions Clause to strip federal court jurisdiction, and 
the attempts of scholars to find limits on that power. This Sec-
tion attempts to bring these two lines of inquiry together by 
considering whether, and how, one particular amendment—the 
First—has “amended” the Exceptions Clause, imposing the li-
mitations that federal courts scholars have long hoped to find. 
The First Amendment says in part that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . or ab-
ridging the freedom of speech.”233 As Part I argued, despite the 
fact that the First Amendment makes no reference to Article I, 
the First Amendment nonetheless amends Article I’s grants of 
congressional power. The lack of textual reference to the tar-
geted provision of the original Constitution does not undermine 
the First Amendment’s effect on Article I; the two are tied to-
gether not by the literal words of the Constitution, but by their 
shared focus on congressional power. 
But as the previous two Sections made clear, Article I is 
not the sole repository of that power. The Exceptions Clause, 
though located in Article III instead of Article I, is fundamen-
tally a grant of legislative power. And whether found in Article 
 
205 (1993) (arguing that the scope of amendment “is bound by the rules of the 
American constitutional enterprise”); Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra 
note 18, at 469–71 & n.31 (suggesting that a “Christianity Amendment” would 
be constitutional, but that an amendment repealing dualist democracy might 
not be); Murphy, supra note 54, at 164; Tribe, supra note 18, at 438–39 (sug-
gesting that some amendments would not “fit” with the constitutional plan). 
 232. See, e.g., Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Uncons-
titutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074 (1991) (arguing that the Flag Burning 
Amendment would violate the Ninth Amendment); The Faith to Change, supra 
note 230 (arguing that Article VII’s oath requirement limits the scope of the 
amendments that Congress may propose under Article V). 
 233. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2008] AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 1017 
 
I or elsewhere, grants of congressional authority in the Consti-
tution are beholden to the limitations imposed by the First 
Amendment.234 Consider the one congressional power that is 
specifically mentioned in Articles I and III: the power to create 
courts inferior to the Supreme Court, which is referenced both 
in Article I, Section 8,235 and in Article III, Section 1.236 Surely 
a subsequent constitutional amendment mandating (or prohi-
biting) the existence of “courts inferior to the Supreme Court” 
would “amend” congressional power under Article I as well as 
under Article III. 
Just as a shared focus on congressional power creates a tie 
between Article I and the Exceptions Clause, the First 
Amendment and the Exceptions Clause are tied together by 
language as well as logic. Amar’s intertextualist framework—
which Part I.D argued is a powerful tool for unraveling the 
meaning of amendments—reveals a clear textual interlock be-
tween the words “with such Exceptions, and under such Regu-
lations as the Congress shall make”237 and the phrase “Con-
gress shall make no law.”238 Since exceptions and regulations 
cannot come about except by law (i.e., congressional action), the 
Amendment seems to target congressional alteration of juris-
diction just as clearly as it targets, for example, congressional 
funding measures.239 Moreover, this reading vindicates the in-
tent of the Amendment’s drafters because it protects courts’ 
power to give meaning to the Bill of Rights, assuaging Anti-
Federalist concerns about an overreaching Congress.240 
 
 234. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 9 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . 
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court . . . .”). 
 236. Id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 237. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 238. Id. amend. I. 
 239. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (noting that the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause means that “[n]o tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or 
practice religion”). 
 240. See supra note 94; see also Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General 
Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1133 (1988) 
(“What united the representatives of all the states, both in Congress and in 
the ratifying legislatures, was a much more narrow purpose: to make it plain 
that Congress was not to legislate on the subject of religion, thereby leaving 
the matter of church-state relations to the individual states.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
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The First Amendment thus alters congressional power un-
der the Exceptions Clause just as it does congressional power 
under Article I. Because of this, Congress may not, for example, 
pass a jurisdiction-stripping law impermissibly “respecting an 
establishment of religion,” nor one “abridging the freedom of 
speech.”241 In other words, Congress has no more (or less) pow-
er to favor religion or to limit speech through regulation of fed-
eral jurisdiction than it does by controlling the power of the 
purse: the First Amendment provides an external constraint on 
the Exceptions Clause. This conclusion does not, of course, ab-
solve courts of determining what kinds of jurisdiction-stripping 
laws are constitutional. Two examples illustrate the point. 
The Public Prayer Protection Act of 2005 was proposed as 
part of a raft of congressional legislation intended to protect re-
ligious practice242—specifically, in the case of the Act, “the right 
of elected and appointed officials to express their religious be-
liefs through public prayer.”243 Declaring that “the exercise of 
this right does not violate the Establishment Clause,”244 the Act 
noted that “Article II, Section 2, clause 2 of the United States 
Constitution [the Exceptions Clause] expressly grants Congress 
the authority to define the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal 
court system.”245 Invoking this power, the Act provided: 
“[T]he Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, 
writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any matter that relates to the alleged 
establishment of religion involving an entity of the Federal Govern-
ment or a State or local government, or an officer or agent of the Fed-
eral Government or a State or local government, acting in an official 
capacity, concerning the expression of public prayer by that entity, of-
ficer, or agent.”246 
Similarly, the Pledge Protection Act247 was proposed in the 
wake of a well-publicized Ninth Circuit decision holding that a 
“school district’s policy and practice of teacher-led recitation of 
the Pledge, with the inclusion of the added words ‘under God,’ 
violates the Establishment Clause.”248 Section 2 of the Act 
reads in part as follows: 
 
 241. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 242. Diana B. Henriques, In the Congressional Hopper: A Long Wish List of 
Special Benefits and Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at A20. 
 243. H.R. 4364, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 244. Id. § 2, cl. 3. 
 245. Id. § 2, cl. 5. 
 246. Id. § 3. 
 247. H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004); see also H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 248. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub 
nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and 
the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or de-
cide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity 
under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance . . . or its recita-
tion.249 
Although the Act does not contain language describing its 
purpose, its supporters made it clear that it was intended to 
prevent the Supreme Court from striking down the Pledge on 
First Amendment grounds. Representative Todd Akin said, 
Essentially what our bill does, if you want to put it in a simple word 
picture, we are creating a fence. The fence goes around the Federal 
judiciary. We do that because we don’t trust them. We don’t trust 
them because of previous decisions and because of the simple fact that 
there are not five votes on the Supreme Court to protect our beloved 
Pledge of Allegiance.250 
Representative Tom DeLay added, “I think that [it] would 
be a very good idea to send a message to the judiciary they 
ought to keep their hands off the Pledge of Allegiance.”251 As 
their names and the statements of their supporters indicate, 
both “Protection Acts” were passed in anticipation of court deci-
sions striking down certain forms of public worship. Rather 
than amending the Constitution to say that various forms of 
prayer are constitutional, the Acts would have prevented feder-
al courts from ruling that they are not. 
Although these jurisdiction-stripping Acts attempt to limit 
First Amendment challenges to public prayer, they are them-
selves legislative acts of Congress subject to the First Amend-
ment. As such, they must not impermissibly “respect[] an es-
tablishment of religion” or “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.”252 
And in analyzing whether these or any other jurisdiction-
stripping laws violate the First Amendment, courts could simp-
 
 249. H.R. 2028, § 2(a). 
 250. 152 CONG. REC. H5415 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Akin). 
 251. Stephen Dinan, DeLay Threatens to Curb Courts’ Jurisdiction; Vents 
Ire over Pledge of Allegiance, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A04. 
 252. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause is a particularly use-
ful example because religiously themed jurisdiction-stripping proposals are 
among the most common Congress has considered and proposed. In addition to 
the examples discussed here, see Religious Liberties Restoration Act, S. 1558, 
108th Cong. (2003) (limiting jurisdiction of federal courts over cases involving 
the Pledge of Allegiance, display of the Ten Commandments, and invocation of 
“In God We Trust”), Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th 
Cong. § 1 (2005) (stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to determine the 
constitutionality of government official’s “acknowledgement of God as the so-
vereign source of law, liberty, or government”), and Constitution Restoration 
Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005) (same). 
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ly import existing First Amendment doctrine. Thus, to be valid, 
a law stripping jurisdiction over Establishment Clause claims 
should be required to meet the three-pronged test set out in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman253: it must advance a secular purpose, must 
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, 
and must not result in an excessive entanglement of govern-
ment and religion.254 If a court finds that an act stripping juris-
diction over Establishment Clause claims fails any of the three 
prongs, it is unconstitutional and invalid. 
Under the Lemon test, both the Public Prayer Protection 
Act and Pledge Protection Act are of questionable validity. 
Whether the Acts have a legitimate secular purpose under the 
first prong is debatable. Their supporters might say (in the face 
of the legislative history and in the absence of factual support) 
that the Acts were passed to clear federal courts’ crowded dock-
ets of Establishment Clause challenges to public prayer, or 
simply to make state courts the primary enforcers of the First 
Amendment in this area.255 On the other hand, the public 
statements of the Acts’ supporters suggest that the main, if not 
singular, purpose of the Acts is not strictly secular, but rather 
an attempt to protect public religious acts from federal court 
review.256  
Thus both Acts would at least raise questions under the 
first prong of Lemon. They are on somewhat stronger footing 
with regard to the second and third prongs. Although the Acts 
would certainly have the effect of advancing religion—that, af-
ter all, is what their supporters designed them to do—it is 
doubtful that this effect would be “primary” and thus violative 
of Lemon’s second prong.257 Similarly, both Acts encourage 
some degree of “entanglement” of government and religion, 
since they would limit First Amendment challenges to prayers 
made either by public officials or in public schools. But it is un-
clear whether the entanglement that would result from barring 
 
 253. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 254. Id. at 612–13. 
 255. Many thanks to William Van Alstyne for bringing this point—among 
many others—to my attention. Of course he bears no blame for any shortcom-
ings in my attempt to address them. 
 256. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1982) (assert-
ing that a statute giving churches and schools the power to effectively veto 
liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius had a “‘primary’ and ‘principal’ effect of 
advancing religion”). 
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such constitutional claims from federal courts would be “exces-
sive” enough to violate Lemon’s third prong.258 
The Public Prayer Protection Act and Pledge Protection Act 
would thus possibly fail one, and perhaps all three, of the Lem-
on test’s prongs. A defender of the Acts might answer that any 
argument against their constitutionality presupposes that pub-
lic prayer, or the “under God” language in the Pledge, violates 
the Establishment Clause. If they do not violate the First 
Amendment, then a jurisdiction-stripping provision preventing 
courts from finding that they do cannot itself violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. But this attempted defense of the Act puts the 
Establishment Clause cart before the jurisdictional horse. De-
termining whether the Pledge violates the Establishment 
Clause in a challenge to a jurisdiction-stripping act would be 
the equivalent of a court asserting jurisdiction to determine 
whether it had jurisdiction, a power that courts always pos-
sess.259 If the Pledge passes the Lemon test, then so does the 
act. If it does not, then neither does the act. In this sense, both 
Acts have an Escher-esque quality: they attempt to strip feder-
al jurisdiction over Establishment Clause challenges, and yet 
they appear themselves to violate that Clause. 
D. CAVEATS AND OTHER AMENDMENTS 
Drawing together Part I’s discussion of the impact of 
amendments and Part II’s discussion of the Exceptions Clause, 
the previous Section argued that the First Amendment imposes 
the same limitations on Congress’s use of its power under the 
Exceptions Clause as it does on all other exercises of congres-
sional power. This thickened understanding of the Exceptions 
Clause’s relationship to the rest of the Constitution provides 
much-needed support to the external constraints theory em-
braced by many federal courts scholars. But just as those scho-
lars have generally not yet marshaled all of the support for 
their position, neither have they considered all of its weak-
nesses. This Section identifies some of those objections and li-
mitations on the application of an external constraints theory. 
 
 258. Id. at 127 (“The challenged statute thus enmeshes churches in the 
processes of government . . . . Ordinary human experience and a long line of 
cases teach that few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of the 
Constitution.” (citation omitted)). 
 259. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 
274 (1926) (Brandeis, J.) (“Every court of general jurisdiction has power to de-
termine whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist.”). 
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One potential objection to the theory of an amended Excep-
tions Clause is that subsequent amendments, rather than 
“amending” the Exceptions Clause, amend the first sentence of 
Article III, Section 2. That sentence reads: “The judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . . .”260 That 
entire phrase, in turn, has been read as being modified by the 
final sentence of the second paragraph, the Exceptions Clause: 
“with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make.”261 If a subsequent amendment were to work 
a change on Article III, one might ask why that change should 
be to the Exceptions Clause (thus limiting Congress’s power 
over federal jurisdiction) as opposed to the first phrase of Ar-
ticle III (thus expanding the range of cases over which the Su-
preme Court has appellate jurisdiction). Under this amend-
ments-as-additions reading, federal courts would have 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the new amendment, but 
that jurisdiction would remain subject to Congress’s unchanged 
Exceptions Clause power. 
Another version of the same argument might say that if an 
amendment’s drafters meant to alter the Exceptions Clause, 
the text of the amendment would make that intention clear. 
Such arguments have been advanced against the internal con-
straints theory of the Exceptions Clause262 and could reasona-
bly be made against the modified external constraints theory 
presented in this Article. Continuing to use the First Amend-
ment as an example, an opponent of the theory treating 
amendments as limitations on Congress’s Exceptions Clause 
power could argue that since the text of the First Amendment 
does not mention the Clause, its impact on the Clause is ambi-
guous. Thus, the more sensible reading would be to simply con-
sider the Amendment as an addition to the Constitution, sub-
ject to the Clause. 
But as applied to the text of amendments, these lack-of-
specificity arguments prove too much. As explained in Part I, 
constitutional amendments rarely identify the text they mean 
to alter, but courts and scholars nonetheless interpret their im-
pact broadly.263 The First Amendment, for example, limits go-
vernmental actors besides the national legislature, even though 
 
 260. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 261. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
 262. Handman, supra note 28, at 207. 
 263. See supra notes 111–14. 
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Congress is the only entity it specifically mentions.264 It would 
be strange indeed if courts required an amendment to contain a 
more specific statement of intent to amend the Exceptions 
Clause, especially since courts considering jurisdiction-
stripping legislation have often required Congress to provide 
specific statements of its intent to strip jurisdiction.265 It seems 
unlikely that the Clause should be given a broad, relatively 
“unamendable” reading when the powers exercised under the 
Clause must be specific, and are construed narrowly. 
Thus far, this Part has focused on the relationship between 
the Exceptions Clause and the First Amendment. But other 
amendments might prove to be even more fertile grounds for 
finding “amendments” to the Clause. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment is an obvious candidate and has been a favorite reference 
point for external constraints theorists.266 This Article has pur-
posefully avoided using the Fourteenth Amendment as a point 
of departure, partially in an attempt to set aside for now the 
complications of the incorporation debate. That debate—
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of 
Rights as against the states—is perhaps the most recognizable 
of the impact-of-amendment discussions laid out in Part I.267 If 
anything, however, the resolution of the incorporation debate—
to the degree that there has been one—supports the general 
thesis that amendments have impacts on the existing Constitu-
tion (including its earlier amendments). 
Perhaps more importantly for the thesis that amendments 
can limit Congress’s Exceptions Clause power, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was, unlike the First Amendment, fundamentally 
an expansion of congressional power.268 Relying on the Four-
 
 264. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 
(1971) (per curiam) (holding that courts had no power to grant the executive’s 
request for an injunction to prevent the New York Times and the Washington 
Post from publishing a classified study regarding U.S. policy in Vietnam); id. 
at 718–19 (Black, J., concurring) (finding that the First Amendment limits the 
President’s power to create judicially enforceable prior restraints on the publi-
cation of newspaper articles); Strauss, supra note 44, at 907. 
 265. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 
85, 104–05 (1869) (noting that the jurisdiction-stripping statute of 1867 con-
tained “no repealing words” and stating that “[r]epeals by implication are not 
favored”). 
 266. See Katyal, supra note 35, at 1367. 
 267. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 18, at 460 (describ-
ing the incorporation debate as “[p]erhaps the most famous modern synthetic 
problem”). 
 268. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“Correctly viewed,  
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teenth Amendment to restrict congressional power, when the 
text of the Amendment so clearly aims to expand it, requires a 
deeper and closer reading than “external constraints” theorists 
have thus far given it, or than this Article can provide.269 Ex-
ternal constraints theorists who rely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment must measure its broad, general language against 
the explicit, clear language of the Exceptions Clause.270 As a re-
sult, they are susceptible to arguments that the clear language 
of the Exceptions Clause must trump penumbras or emana-
tions from elsewhere.271 The First Amendment, by contrast, is 
both specific—in that it is directed at Congress—and, unlike 
the Fourteenth Amendment, clearly restricts the government’s 
power. This does not mean that Congress’s Exceptions Clause 
power is not subject to due process or equal protection limita-
tions; it suggests only that describing these limitations de-
mands more attention than scholars have devoted to it. 
Finally, it should be noted that the argument regarding 
constitutional amendment presented in Part I of this Article is 
fundamentally one about the U.S. Constitution, not state con-
stitutions or other constitutive documents.272 State constitu-
 
§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its 
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 269. Interestingly enough, Chief Justice John Roberts, then a Special As-
sistant to the Attorney General, noted in a memorandum about congressional 
control over federal jurisdiction that “Congress may derive additional authori-
ty in regulating Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over Fourteenth 
Amendment cases by virtue of §5 of that Amendment.” Memorandum from 
John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen., Proposals to Divest the Su-
preme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction: An Analysis in Light of Recent Devel-
opments 25 (n.d.), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/ 
accession-60-89-0172/006-Box5-Folder1522.pdf [hereinafter Roberts, Memo-
randum] (emphasis added). 
 270. Redish, supra note 29, at 907–08; Rice, supra note 182, at 975 (“[T]he 
exceptions clause is clear, unambiguous, and unqualified.”). 
 271. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Con-
trol the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical View and New Syn-
thesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 72 (1975) (“[T]he language and history of article 
III are so clear that any alteration, even to accomplish the framers’ purposes, 
must come by amendment and not by interpretation in light of ‘changing cir-
cumstances.’”). During a congressional debate on the issue, Senator Sam Ervin 
noted, “I don’t believe that the Founding Fathers could have found any simpler 
words or plainer words in the English language to say what they said, which 
was that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is dependent entirely 
upon the will of Congress.” Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of 
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 22 (1968) (statement of 
Sen. Ervin). 
 272. For an international approach, see Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Suns-
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tions vary in their amendment procedures, but many make 
amendment a much less difficult—and much less radical—
proposition than the U.S. Constitution does. Donald Lutz’s in-
teresting comparative study of federal and state constitutional 
amendment reports that state constitutions are amended at 
nearly ten times the rate of the U.S. Constitution.273 The Ala-
bama constitution, to take the most striking example, was 
amended 726 times between 1901 and 1991.274 Statutes, too, 
generally present a distinct model of amendment; one which 
differs from both the state constitution model and the Federal 
Constitution model described here. Unlike their constitutional 
cousins, statutes are often amended through a specific process 
of strike-outs that specifically identify the sections or parts of 
the statute to be replaced. There are structural (not to mention 
practical) problems preventing courts from applying a nuanced 
reading to the “amendment” of statutes and state constitutions, 
many of which contain hundreds or thousands of provisions 
enacted at hundreds or thousands of different times.275 But the 
U.S. Constitution, the interpretation of whose minutiae has oc-
cupied courts and scholars for hundreds of years, not only al-
lows for such a close reading, but demands it. 
E. EXPLICITLY AMENDING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 
The theory of constitutional amendment described in Part I 
of this Article requires interpreters to consider whether, even 
in the absence of a specific reference to a target provision, an 
amendment changes the text of the “Original Constitution.”276 
 
tein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 51, at 275, 275 (“The procedure for constitution-
al modification best adapted to Eastern Europe today sets relatively lax condi-
tions for amendment, keeps unamendable provisions to a minimal core of basic 
rights and institutions, and usually allows the process to be monopolized by 
parliament, without any obligatory recourse to popular referenda.”). 
 273. Lutz, supra note 51, at 247. 
 274. Id. at 248. 
 275. See Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 
580 (1915) (“Not only are [state constitutions] subject to constant change, but 
they have long since ceased to be constitutions in a true sense. . . . No one now 
entertains any particular respect for a state constitution. It has little more 
dignity than an ordinary act of the legislature.”); Tribe, supra note 18, at 442 
n.42 (“The cluttered and rapidly changing contents of state constitutions may 
partially explain why even the most enduring and fundamental provisions of 
these documents rarely command the respect routinely paid to federal consti-
tutional guarantees.” (citing Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of 
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1353–56 (1982))). 
 276. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X pmbl. 
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Part II.C argued that the First Amendment may have implicit-
ly amended the Exceptions Clause, thus limiting Congress’s 
power over federal jurisdiction. But the caveats described in the 
previous Section are themselves weighty, and their resolution 
remains unclear. If anything, the preceding discussion has illu-
strated not just the possibilities, but the pitfalls of a constitu-
tional analysis that relies on implicit amendment of the Excep-
tions Clause. 
The better solution for proponents of a vulnerable amend-
ment—that is, one ratified by a temporary supermajority but 
potentially subject to a jurisdiction-stripping bill passed by a 
subsequent simple majority—is to insulate it from jurisdiction-
stripping legislation by guaranteeing the Supreme Court’s ju-
risdiction over cases arising under the amendment.277 An 
amendment could, for example, include a provision stating, 
“The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all 
cases arising under this amendment, notwithstanding Con-
gress’s power to make exceptions and regulations to that juris-
diction.” Another alternative more in line with the “Congress 
shall have power to enforce” language found in other amend-
ments278 is, “The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdic-
tion over cases arising under this amendment.” Such a provi-
sion would implicitly but clearly amend Article III, preserving 
Congress’s power to remove lower federal courts’ jurisdiction 
over the amendment while protecting the Supreme Court’s fi-
nal, appellate review. 
While future amendments may include language guaran-
teeing Supreme Court review of cases arising under their 
terms, none of the twenty-seven amendments currently ap-
pended to the U.S. Constitution say anything about jurisdiction 
or courts’ responsibility for enforcing them.279 Some of the 
amendments—especially the Fifth and the Sixth—are clearly 
 
 277. See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 153, at 21–22 (ar-
guing that supporters of amendments should attempt “to think through and 
articulate the consequences of their proposal, including the ways in which the 
amendment would interact with other constitutional provisions and prin-
ciples”). 
 278. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. 
XV, § 2. 
 279. In a 1963 Yale Law Journal piece, Charles Black excoriated a then-
pending amendment which would have directly altered Article V, replacing its 
current text with new language essentially eliminating Congress’s role in the 
amendment process. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 
52; Black, A Letter to a Congressman, supra note 52. The proposed amendment 
soon died. 
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directed at courts, and indeed Madison originally proposed that 
those two amendments be interwoven with the text of Article 
III.280 But even so, the amendments by their terms say nothing 
about federal courts’ duty to enforce them. 
This deafening silence regarding judicial power contrasts 
with the increasingly loud expansions of congressional power in 
constitutional amendments passed since the Civil War.281 To 
take just three examples, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Nine-
teenth Amendments all identically provide that “Congress shall 
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”282 
Similar phrases adorn most of the amendments passed since 
the Civil War era,283 most notably Section 5 of the Four-
teenth.284 These Amendments are grants of congressional pow-
er, not limitations on it. 
Looking back on the amendment process described in Part 
I, the legislative power-expanding nature of these amendments 
may be unsurprising, given Congress’s powerful role in the 
amendment process.285 Indeed, the very structure of Article V 
seems to create momentum for this legislative-empowering 
trend in constitutional amendment. After all, every constitu-
tional amendment has originated as a congressional propos-
al.286 The simple political reality may be that Congress is un-
likely to add a provision limiting its institutional power to 
control the fate of an amendment it has proposed. 
The greatest counterexample to this reading of amend-
ments as legislature-empowering is the Bill of Rights.287 But 
while many of the first ten amendments expressly limit con-
gressional power, they also represent something of a special 
case, having been passed in part to assuage Anti-Federalist 
 
 280. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 281. KYVIG, supra note 84, at 154–55. 
 282. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XV, XIX. 
 283. See, e.g., id. amends. XIV, XV, XVIII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI. 
 284. Id. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 285. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitution-
al Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 976 (1993) (“For Congress at least, the legislative 
role in proposing constitutional amendments often was seen as a special sub-
set of the general legislative duty to interpret the Constitution.”). 
 286. The Twenty-first Amendment, ending Prohibition, was ratified by 
state conventions, but it was proposed by Congress. See Everett S. Brown, The 
Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, 29 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1005, 
1005–17 (1935). 
 287. See Amar, supra note 133. 
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concerns about the power of the federal government.288 The 
Eleventh Amendment, which followed in short order, also effec-
tively limited federal power.289 Moreover, on the eve of the Civil 
War, Congress proposed an amendment that would have li-
mited federal power by altering Article V itself. The proposal—
known as the Corwin Amendment—provided that “[n]o 
amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will au-
thorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, 
within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, includ-
ing that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said 
State.”290 Lincoln endorsed the Amendment (which ironically 
would have been the thirteenth) and three Union-side states 
ratified it before the Civil War broke out and the legislators 
scrapped the effort.291 Thus, prior to the Civil War, there was a 
clear pattern of passing amendments that limited congressional 
power. 
In contrast, the clear trend since the Civil War has been for 
amendments to expand the legislature’s power. A constitutional 
amendment lessening Congress’s power under the Exceptions 
Clause may thus have to overcome a fair bit of institutional 
momentum, but it is not an impossibility. In addition to propos-
ing the Bill of Rights, Congress has occasionally pronounced its 
fidelity to the ideal of an independent judiciary,292 and individ-
 
 288. Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-Seventh Cleveland-Marshall Lecture: “The 
Bill of Rights and Our Posterity,” 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 575 (1994) 
(“Though proposed by the Federalist Madison, the original Bill of Rights re-
flects its Anti-Federalist parentage as well.”); William Michael Treanor, The 
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 782, 843 n.308 (1995) (“The movement to secure a bill of rights 
came from Anti-federalists who wanted to limit the national government’s 
power.”); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1699, 1705 (1991) (“The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to incorporate these 
Anti-Federalist protections into the predominantly Federalist document.”). 
 289. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (limiting federal jurisdiction in cases where 
states are parties). 
 290. See Mark E. Brandon, The “Original” Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Limits to Formal Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, 
supra note 51, at 215, 216–20. 
 291. Id. at 219. 
 292. Following its rejection of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary declared, 
Let us now set a salutatory precedent that will never be violated. Let 
us, of the Seventy-fifth Congress, in words that will never be disre-
garded by any succeeding Congress, declare that we would rather 
have an independent Court, a fearless Court, a Court that will dare to 
announce its honest opinions in what it believes to be the defense of 
liberties of the people, than a Court that, out of fear or sense of obli-
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ual legislators have sometimes willingly foregone politically 
appealing jurisdiction-stripping measures for such principled 
reasons as the importance of an independent judiciary.293 While 
these attitudes may indicate that an amendment explicitly li-
miting congressional power under the Exceptions Clause is not 
impossible, no constitutional amendment has specifically 
amended the Exceptions Clause. Further, few scholars or legis-
lators seem to have given much thought to the potential for 
amendments to limit Exceptions Clause power.294 But in light 
of Congress’s increasing flirtation with jurisdiction-stripping 
legislation, the possibility can no longer be ignored. 
 CONCLUSION  
Bruce Ackerman recently noted that “[a] funny thing hap-
pened to Americans on the way to the twenty-first century. We 
have lost our ability to write down our new constitutional 
commitments in the old-fashioned way.”295 But perhaps what 
has really happened is that Congress has abandoned Article V 
as a method of recording those commitments and has instead 
 
gation to the appointing power, or factional passion, approves any 
measure we may enact. We are not the judges of the judges. We are 
not above the Constitution. 
S. REP. NO. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1937). 
 293. 128 CONG. REC. 2242 (statement of Sen. Goldwater) (expanding on his 
“concern about proposals that would interfere with Federal court indepen-
dence”). 
 294. The one counterexample I have found is a proposal, supported by for-
mer Justice Owen Roberts, to excise the Exceptions Clause entirely. Owen J. 
Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court’s Independence, 35 
A.B.A. J. 1 (1949). The year after Hart’s influential article was published, 
Senator Butler proposed just such an amendment, a revision he claimed was 
necessary to protect the Court from congressional interference. See S.J. Res. 
44, 83d Cong. (1954); 99 CONG. REC. 1106–07 (1954) (statement of Sen. But-
ler); see also S. REP. NO. 83-1091, at 2 (1954) (“The purpose of this joint resolu-
tion . . . is to fortify the independence of the judiciary by amendments to the 
Constitution, thereby forestalling efforts by any future President or Congress 
seeking to nullify or impair the power of the judicial branch of government.”). 
Although the Senate passed the bill, and the American Bar Association sup-
ported it, the House tabled the initiative. Roberts, Memorandum, supra note 
269, at 21. 
Illustrating the political volatility of the constitutional issues described 
here, Senator Butler also spearheaded an effort three years later to strip the 
Court’s power over congressional attempts to target “subversive activities.” 
Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to 
Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003, 1042 (2006) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 295. Ackerman, The Living Constitution, supra note 79, at 1741. 
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employed its power under the Exceptions Clause to pass juris-
diction-stripping legislation. As the latter increasingly replaces 
the former as the preferred method of adjusting courts’ treat-
ment of constitutional questions, the relationship between the 
two demands increasing attention. 
Unfortunately, scholars of constitutional amendment and 
of federal jurisdiction have too often wandered in different 
parts of the same forest, lost in the difficult problems presented 
by their respective obsessions and failing to appreciate the in-
sights they have to offer each other. This Article describes a 
path between them. Perhaps a better understanding of 
amendments’ unique status as external constraints will make it 
easier to find limits on the Exceptions Clause. And perhaps a 
theory more tied to the text of the Constitution will give the 
Supreme Court stronger footing from which to begin outlining 
the limits on Congress’s power over federal-court jurisdiction. 
